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WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH
AND SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER POST-SUMMUM
Scott W. Gaylord*

Across the country, federal, state, and local legislative bodies begin
their meetings with prayer. Yet, as recent challenges to sectarian
legislative prayer demonstrate, legislative prayer rests uneasily at the
intersection of the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. While the
government has the right to speak for itself, many contend that it is
precluded from engaging in paradigmatic religious activity, such as
sectarian prayer. As a result, although legislative prayer has been
part of the “fabric of our society” since at least the First Continental
Congress, sectarian prayer teeters on the brink of unconstitutionality.
Despite the pervasiveness of legislative prayer and the importance of
the constitutional issues it raises, the United States Supreme Court did
not decide a legislative prayer case until Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.
In Marsh, the Court upheld legislative prayers generally but did not
explain how Marsh fit within the Court’s broader Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Subsequent Supreme Court and lower court
decisions, therefore, have treated Marsh as a narrow exception to the
Supreme Court’s general Establishment Clause rules.
This Article examines recent developments that undermine the
traditional view of Marsh as a limited exception and places Marsh at
the center of the Court’s current view of facially religious government
speech. In particular, after analyzing the Court’s discussions of
legislative prayer in Marsh and Allegheny, this Article focuses on the
recent flood of challenges to sectarian legislative prayers, comparing
the widely divergent conclusions reached by the seven circuit courts
that have heard such cases. It then explores how the Supreme Court’s
2009 decision in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City provides a new lens

* Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law. The author had primary
responsibility for preparing the “Brief of Amicus Curiae Independence Law Center in Support of
Forsyth County, North Carolina” in Joyner v. Forsyth County, North Carolina, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Record No. 10-1232, which currently is on appeal to the Fourth Circuit
and which directly implicates many of the issues discussed in this Article.
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through which Marsh may be interpreted, contending that the Court’s
“recently minted” government speech doctrine (1) is inconsistent with
the endorsement test and, in fact, (2) mandates the Establishment
Clause test the Court first developed in Marsh. In the last Part, this
Article considers the constitutionality of sectarian and nonsectarian
legislative prayer in light of Marsh and Summum, arguing that, under
this “new” standard, federal, state, and local governments can
continue to engage in legislative prayer, even if those prayers contain
sectarian references.
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INTRODUCTION
Marsh v. Chambers 1 is generally known as the case that held
legislative prayer to be consistent with the requirements of the
Establishment Clause. But Marsh is also commonly known as an outlier
in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and as an
exception to the Court’s traditional rules, such as the Lemon and
endorsement tests. 2 This reputation resulted, in part, from the Court’s
failure to explain how Marsh fit within existing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
The Court approved legislative prayer without
mentioning, let alone distinguishing, Lemon v. Kurtzman, which set
forth the then-dominant Establishment Clause test. 3 Moreover, the
Court’s subsequent discussion of Marsh in Allegheny and Lee reinforced
the view that Marsh was justified only by virtue of the “unique history”
of legislative prayer. 4 Although neither case involved legislative prayer,
both suggested that Marsh should not be extended to other contexts,
such as holiday displays or high school graduations.
But there is another, more fundamental reason why courts treat Marsh
as an exception: legislative prayer sits uneasily at the intersection of the
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. While the government has the
right to speak for itself, it cannot engage in paradigmatic religious
activity, such as sectarian prayer—i.e., legislative prayers that make
express references to specific deities. 5 Thus, even if Marsh allows for
1. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
2. See, e.g., id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is carving out an exception to the
Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative
prayer.”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (“The Lemon test has been applied in all
cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court held that the Nebraska
Legislature’s practice of opening a session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate
the Establishment Clause.” (citation omitted)); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Ga., 547 F.3d 1263, 1269
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Our ‘delicate and fact-sensitive’ inquiry is evident in the area of legislative prayer,
which the Supreme Court, in Marsh . . . , excepted from the traditional analysis under the Establishment
Clause.”); id. at 1286 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting) (“Marsh is an outlier in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.”).
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010); Robert Luther III, “Unity Through Division”: Religious
Liberty and the Virtue of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1 (2009); Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
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generic legislative prayers, lower courts and commentators contend that
it cannot permit sectarian references because through such prayers the
government would be espousing specific deities and religious beliefs,
which directly violates the Establishment Clause. Consequently, these
groups argue that Marsh must be limited to nonsectarian invocations.
Yet, Marsh does not expressly limit its holding in this way. In fact,
the Court in Marsh states that courts should not “parse the content of a
particular prayer” unless there is evidence that the government intended
to exploit “the prayer opportunity . . . to proselytize or advance any one,
or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” 6 But if courts cannot look at
the content of the legislative prayer, how can they distinguish between
sectarian and nonsectarian prayers? Is the distinction irrelevant under
Marsh? And, if not, does the same test apply to each type of prayer
under the Establishment Clause?
In the last few years, several circuit courts have addressed these
questions and, as a result, have brought Marsh out of the shadows and
into the Establishment Clause spotlight. Given the uncertain status of
Marsh, these courts understandably have struggled in deciding whether
the Establishment Clause permits sectarian legislative prayer and have
reached different conclusions. For example, while the Eleventh Circuit
approved a Georgia policy permitting sectarian legislative prayer,7 the
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that certain sectarian
invocations were unconstitutional. 8 The Fifth Circuit originally issued a
fractured opinion rejecting sectarian prayer, 9 but the en banc court,
unable to garner a majority view on the proper scope of Marsh,
ultimately dismissed the case on standing grounds. 10 The Seventh
Circuit disposed of a case in the same way. 11 And the Fourth Circuit
1171 (2009); Robert J. Delahunty, “Varied Carols”: Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 517 (2006); Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the
Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008);
Robert Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the “Prayer Police”: Why the First
Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a “Practice Focused” Analysis, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569 (2008); Anne Abrell, Note, Just a Little Talk With Jesus: Reaching the
Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145 (2007); Jeremy G. Mallory,
Comment, “An Officer of the House Which Chooses Him, and Nothing More”: How Should Marsh v.
Chambers Apply to Rotating Chaplains?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (2006).
6. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
7. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d 1263.
8. Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Snyder v. Murray City
Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006).
10. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe II), 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
11. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II), 506 F.3d
584 (7th Cir. 2007).
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currently is considering an appeal of a district court decision that struck
down a policy that permitted sectarian prayers at the beginning of
County Commissioner meetings. 12
Amid all of this uncertainty, the Supreme Court recently decided
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 13 which this Article argues establishes
a “new” standard for facially religious government speech, such as
legislative prayers. But, as it turns out, the new standard is Marsh’s old
one. If the government “controls” the speech, it may engage in facially
religious speech provided that it does not have an impermissible motive.
In other words, consistent with Marsh, sectarian and nonsectarian
legislative prayers are constitutional provided that the government does
not promote or disparage a particular religion: “[W]here, as here, there is
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief[,] . . . it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.” 14 Thus, post-Summum, Marsh
is no longer an exception but rather a cornerstone of the Court’s
Establishment Clause analysis of legislative prayer and other forms of
facially religious government speech.
To explore this recent development in the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Part I of this Article focuses on the
Court’s reasoning in Marsh, specifically how it diverged from the thencurrent Lemon test and how the Court’s subsequent reliance on the
endorsement test limited Marsh’s scope. Part II explores the current
circuit split regarding sectarian invocations, arguing that, in light of
Summum¸ Marsh has assumed a central place within the Court’s
Establishment Clause analysis, fulfilling the broad role that Justice
Kennedy and three other Justices championed in dissent in Allegheny.
Finally, Part III considers the constitutionality of a particular prayer
policy modeled on the policy that the Fourth Circuit is currently
considering in Joyner v. Forsyth County. This Article argues that this
type of prayer policy—which is open to all religious groups in the
community and allows diverse religious leaders to make sectarian
references to their own deities—is constitutional under Marsh.
Moreover, this is true whether the legislative prayers are deemed to be
government speech under Summum or private speech under the Court’s

12. Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009).
13. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
14. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
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2010 decision in Salazar v. Buono. 15 As a result, Marsh is no longer an
outlier; rather, the Court now embraces the principles of Marsh and is
apt to apply those principles to facially religious government speech.
Stated differently, the exception has become the rule.
I. THE MARSH “EXCEPTION”: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE
UNIQUE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
Despite the prevalence of legislative prayer at the time of the
Founding, 16 the Constitution does not expressly address the practice.
The religion clauses of the First Amendment, which apply to the states
and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 provide
only that the government “shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 18
Given the importance of religion in our nation’s history as well as in the
lives of many of its citizens, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
has decided numerous cases involving the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. What is surprising, however, is that, given the longstanding history of legislative prayer in the United States, 19 the Court
did not decide a case challenging legislative prayer until Marsh in
1983. 20
By the time it finally heard a legislative prayer case, the Court
appeared to have settled on the Lemon test as the governing
Establishment Clause framework. Pursuant to this three-prong test, to
survive Establishment Clause review, the challenged government action
(1) “must have a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”
and (3) “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’” 21 Applying this test to the facts in Marsh, the Eighth Circuit
15. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
16. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88.
17. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (assuming that the First
Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in allowing the state
to reimburse parents for the cost of public transportation to public and parochial schools).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (“[T]he practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued
without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”).
20. For a detailed account of the history of congressional chaplains, which directly implicates the
history surrounding legislative prayer, see Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009). Although various challenges were made to the practice
throughout our nation’s history, politics, congressional wrangling, and even standing requirements
prevented the Supreme Court from hearing a challenge to legislative prayer until Marsh. See, e.g., Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City
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held that the invocations at the start of Nebraska’s legislative sessions
violated the Establishment Clause. 22 Although the Eighth Circuit’s
analysis was unremarkable in light of Lemon, the United States Supreme
Court’s analysis had a novel and unexpectedly originalist bent. Instead
of applying—or even mentioning—Lemon, the Marsh majority looked
to “historical evidence” to determine “what the draftsmen intended the
Establishment Clause to mean” as well as “how they thought that Clause
applied to the [legislative prayer] practice authorized by the First
Congress.” 23 Marsh’s new “test” for legislative prayer, though, directly
conflicted with Lemon. And as a majority of the Court began shifting
from Lemon to the endorsement test, this conflict only increased,
entrenching Marsh as an exception to the Court’s general Establishment
Clause rules. 24
A. Marsh and Legislative Prayer: The Shift Away from Lemon
For more than a century, the Nebraska legislature began its legislative
sessions with an invocation. In 1965, Nebraska hired Robert E. Palmer,
a Presbyterian minister, to give the opening prayer at the start of each
legislative session. For the next sixteen years, Nebraska paid Mr.
Palmer a monthly stipend for each month the legislature was in session.
Although his prayers originally contained some expressly Christian
references, the minister removed specific references to “Christ” in 1980
and subsequently gave only nondenominational invocations. 25 Despite
the generic character of the legislative prayers, Ernie Chambers, a
member of the Nebraska legislature, filed an action to enjoin both the
practice of having legislative prayers and the state’s paying the minister
out of state funds.
Although the district court found the prayer practice constitutional, it
struck down Nebraska’s paying its chaplain out of state funds. The
of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
22. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783 (1983);
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (“Applying the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . , the [Eighth Circuit]
held that the chaplaincy practice violated all three elements of the test: the purpose and primary effect of
selecting the same minister for 16 years and publishing his prayers was to promote a particular religious
expression; use of state money for compensation and publication led to entanglement.”).
23. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
24. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 872 n.2 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]his unique history’ justified carving out
an exception for the specific practice in question. Given that the [Marsh] decision upholding this
practice was expressly limited to its facts, then, it would stand the Establishment Clause on its head to
extract from it a broad rule permitting the funding of religious activities.” (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at
791)).
25. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14.
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Eighth Circuit, reversing in part, held that both practices violated all
three prongs of the Lemon test:
Such a practice violates all three elements of the constitutional test
applicable here. The purpose of the practice as a whole must be to
advance and give preference to one religious view over others. . . .
The primary effect of the practice as a whole is unmistakably to
advance religion and to give preference to one religious view. The state
has placed its official seal of approval on one religious view for sixteen
years and has stood behind that seal with its funds—both to compensate
the minister and to publish his prayer books. . . .
The prayer practice also entangles the state with religion in precisely
the manner warned of in Bogen. By using state monies to compensate the
same minister for sixteen years and to publish his prayer books, the state
engenders serious political division along religious lines. 26

In so holding, the Eighth Circuit foreshadowed Justice Brennan’s
dissent. According to Justice Brennan, allowing the same Presbyterian
minister to give Judeo–Christian prayers for sixteen years, regardless of
whether such prayers were “nondenominational,” demonstrated the
government’s intent to promote that denomination over all others. 27 The
effect of Nebraska’s policies was to promote religion over non-religion
and to promote Presbyterianism over other sects.
Although Lemon was dispositive for the Eighth Circuit and the Marsh
dissenters, the Court’s majority opinion did not mention Lemon or Engel
v. Vitale. 28 Instead of relying on Establishment Clause precedent, the
majority focused on what it viewed as more fundamental—the meaning
of the Establishment Clause at the time of the Founding. According to
the majority, legislative prayer was “deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country,” 29 reaching back to at least 1774 when the
Continental Congress, like Nebraska’s unicameral legislature, “open[ed]
its sessions with a prayer offered by a paid chaplain.” 30 Moreover, the
26. Chambers, 675 F.2d at 234–35. Although frequently overlooked, the Eighth Circuit
specifically acknowledged that, even under Lemon, neither legislative prayers nor retaining a paid
chaplain are per se unconstitutional: “We do not hold that invocations alone are unconstitutional.
Indeed, Bogen demonstrates that some invocation practices can be constitutionally conducted. Nor do
we hold that a legislative chaplaincy, even a paid chaplaincy, is per se unconstitutional.” Id. at 235.
27. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of legislative
prayer is preeminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident. ‘To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws’ . . . is nothing but a religious act. . . . The
‘primary effect’ of legislative prayer is also clearly religious. . . . [I]nvocations in Nebraska’s legislative
halls explicitly link religious belief and observance to the power and prestige of the State.”).
28. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding, in the first case dealing with government-sponsored prayer,
that the state could not create a prayer to be recited at the start of each school day).
29. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
30. Id. at 787.
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Court emphasized that the Founders approved the language of the Bill of
Rights three days after the First Congress, “as one of its early items of
business, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session
with prayer.” 31
But historical practice was critical to the Marsh majority not because
it validated all contemporaneous religious practices but because it
revealed the meaning of the Establishment Clause:
Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did not
view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has
continued without interruption ever since that early session of
Congress. . . .
. . . In this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what
the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on
how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the
First Congress—their actions reveal their intent. 32

Because the First Congress expressly provided for paid chaplains while
finalizing the language of the First Amendment, legislative prayer is
consistent with both the intent of the Founders and the meaning of the
religion clauses: “Marsh stands for the proposition, not that specific
practices common in 1791 are an exception to the otherwise broad
sweep of the Establishment Clause, but rather that the meaning of the
Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practice and
understandings.” 33
Two important and often overlooked consequences flow from the
majority’s appeal to history. First, the history of legislative prayer
demonstrates that the Establishment Clause does not require the
complete separation of church and state. In certain circumstances, such
as legislative invocations, the government can engage in facially
religious speech even if it has the effect of promoting religion over nonreligion. Rather than threatening Establishment Clause principles, the
long-standing history of legislative prayers reflects an important, shared
system of beliefs upon which our country and its institutions were
founded:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years,
there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
31. Id. at 787–88.
32. Id. at 788–89.
33. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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circumstances, an “establishment” of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country. As Justice Douglas observed,
“[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.” 34

Second, although historical practice may help determine the meaning
of the Establishment Clause, it does not, by itself, provide a means to
distinguish legislative prayers that are consistent with the Establishment
Clause from those that are not. The two hundred year unbroken history
indicates that “the delegates did not consider opening prayers as a
proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government’s
‘official seal of approval on one religious view,’” 35 but not all legislative
prayer policies are constitutional: “To invoke Divine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward
establishment.” 36 Hence, following its review of historical practices, the
Court does something that most courts and commentators have
ignored—it sets out a new Establishment Clause test for legislative
prayers. To better understand the nature and scope of this test, one must
look not only at the majority’s opinion, but also at what it necessarily
rejects—the reasoning of the Lemon test.
1. Marsh’s New Establishment Clause Test—Impermissible
Government Intent
Because historical practice does not justify all forms of legislative
prayer, 37 the Marsh majority needed to provide a test for distinguishing
between constitutional and unconstitutional legislative prayers. 38 And
34. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added); id. at 791 (There is “no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising
from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged.”) (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“It is
obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long
use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an
unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside.”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (“Standing
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees . . . .”).
38. The Court frequently has applied specific Establishment Clause tests in certain situations but
not others: “Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily
be reduced to a single test.” Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720
(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Accordingly, it is not surprising
that an Establishment Clause test developed in the context of display cases would not apply in a
different context, namely, legislative prayers: “The Court today does only what courts must do in many
Establishment Clause cases—focus on specific features of a particular government action to ensure that
it does not violate the Constitution.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss3/3

10

Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
G-GAYLORD

2011]

8/4/2011 2:15:21 PM

SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER

1027

the majority did just that in the last section of its opinion. In particular,
to determine whether Nebraska’s prayer policy was constitutional, the
Court looked at the specific “features” of the challenged policy, namely
the selection process, the use of public funds to pay the chaplain, and the
use of Judeo–Christian prayers. 39 The Court, however, did not subject
each feature to the Lemon test. Instead, given that the Establishment
Clause generally permits legislative prayer, the majority focused on the
government’s intent—whether it meant to use the prayer opportunity for
an impermissibly religious purpose. That is, because the Founders did
not intend the Establishment Clause to preclude invocations, legislative
prayer violates that Establishment Clause only if the government
engages in the practice for improper reasons—to proselytize, promote,
or disparage a particular religion. In this way, Marsh is consistent with
the overarching requirement of the Establishment Clause: “The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” 40
For example, with respect to Nebraska’s selecting the same
Presbyterian minister to give the legislative invocations for sixteen
years, the Court held that there is no Establishment Clause violation
“[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an
impermissible motive.” 41 That is, unless there is evidence that the
government used the selection process to “advance[] the beliefs of a
particular church,” 42 the Nebraska legislature could retain the same
person to give the invocations without running afoul of the
Establishment Clause. Similarly, the majority found no Establishment
Clause problem in paying the invocation speaker with public funds.
Given that the first Congress and various states paid their chaplains out
of public funds, such “remuneration is grounded in historic practice” and
does not violate the Establishment Clause. 43
The fact that Nebraska’s legislative prayers were in the Judeo–
Christian tradition, however, might create an Establishment Clause
problem even though chaplain selection and remuneration did not. Even
if the Founders understood the Establishment Clause to allow for
legislative prayer, they did not intend to permit the government to
“advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” 44 But, so
852 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
39. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93; id. at 792 (“We turn then to the question of whether any features
of the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause.”).
40. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
41. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 793.
43. Id. at 794.
44. Id. at 794–95.
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the argument goes, Judeo–Christian prayers violate the Constitution
because they do just that.
The majority rejected this line of argument, recognizing that by its
very nature prayer is always from some perspective; 45 as a practical
matter, the person giving an invocation cannot give a prayer that refers
to all religious faiths or traditions. Moreover, the practice of legislative
prayer that had “become part of the fabric of our society” was from this
same Judeo–Christian perspective. 46 Accordingly, the Court declined to
scrutinize the particular perspective (i.e., the content of the legislative
prayer) unless there was evidence that the government sought to use the
prayer to advance a particular faith: “The content of the prayer is not of
concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief.” 47 As with the chaplain selection
process, the intent of the legislature was critical to the Court’s analysis.
When deciding whether a legislative prayer violates the Establishment
Clause, courts must first determine whether there is any indication of
improper motive. And Justice Stevens, in his Marsh dissent, interpreted
the majority’s decision in just this way: “The Court holds that a
chaplain’s 16-year tenure is constitutional as long as there is no proof
that his reappointment ‘stemmed from an impermissible motive.’ Thus,
once again, the Court makes the subjective motivation of legislators the
decisive criterion for judging the constitutionality of a state legislative
practice.” 48
Under Marsh’s impermissible intent test, then, legislative invocations
are constitutional provided that the government neither intends to
promote one faith through the selection of the prayer-giver nor
improperly uses the prayer opportunity to advance or disparage a
particular faith. In this way, Marsh builds off Lemon’s purpose prong
and rejects the other prongs. But, instead of burdening the government
by requiring it to show a secular purpose, one challenging the legislative
prayer must demonstrate that the government has the impermissible

45. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 5, at 522 (“Every prayer, by its very nature, reflects and
conveys a particular system of beliefs about the nature of ultimate reality and is thus ‘sectarian.’”). For
a more detailed analysis of the Establishment Clause problems related to mandated nonsectarian prayer,
see John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 515
(2004); William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of
National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 199 (2002); Michael W. McConnell,
Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 163 (1986); and the sources cited in
supra note 5.
46. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
47. Id. at 794–95.
48. Id. at 823 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intent “to proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief.” 49 Thus,
Marsh does more than simply create a limited exception to the Lemon
test; Marsh establishes a new way of analyzing facially religious
government speech, articulating an “intent” standard that, at the time,
was unique to legislative prayers.
2. Justice Brennan and the Lemon Test—What the Majority Opinion
Does Not Mean
The majority and dissents had two fundamental disagreements regarding
the scope of the Establishment Clause: (1) the applicable test for
legislative prayer and (2) the underlying purpose of the Establishment
Clause.
As if to highlight these differences, Justice Brennan
immediately tried to limit the scope of Marsh, characterizing it as an
exception to the Court’s general Establishment Clause rules: “That [the
Court did not apply any of the traditional Establishment Clause tests]
simply confirms that the Court is carving out an exception to the
Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.” 50 Instead of invoking
history to create an exception, Justice Brennan would have applied
Lemon and held Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy unconstitutional:
“In sum, I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to
apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.” 51
Echoing the Eighth Circuit, Justice Brennan claimed that Nebraska’s
legislative invocations violated all three prongs of the Lemon test. For
Justice Brennan, it was “self-evident” that the purpose of legislative
prayer—“‘invok[ing] Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws’”—was preeminently religious. 52 To the extent such
religious activity serves any secular function, that function can be
accomplished just as easily through non-religious means. 53 Whereas the
majority invoked cases that expressly allow the government to consider
religion, 54 Justice Brennan appealed to the public school cases in which
49. Id. at 794–95 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 800–01.
52. Id. at 797.
53. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 673
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the endorsement test and stating “I fail to see why prayer is
the only way to convey these messages; appeals to patriotism, moments of silence, and any number of
other approaches would be as effective, were the only purposes at issue the ones described by the Lynch
concurrence”).
54. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a state
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the Court struck down the posting of the Ten Commandments, banned
the teaching of creationism, and prohibited state-sponsored Bible
reading in schools. 55 Because the purpose of the religious activity is the
same in the schools and in the legislature—to advance religion over nonreligion—both violate Lemon’s purpose prong.
According to Justice Brennan, Nebraska’s invocations also failed the
second prong of Lemon because the “‘primary effect’ of legislative
prayer is also clearly religious.” 56 Drawing on the school prayer cases
once again, Justice Brennan focused on two impermissible effects of
having official prayers: the “indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion” 57
and the “explicit[] link” created between “religious belief and
observance [and] the power and prestige of the State.” 58 The latter was
of greater concern to Justice Brennan because even the “‘mere
appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and
State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of
some by reason of the power conferred.’” 59 Moreover, some people,
learning that the government has “linked” itself with religion through
legislative prayer, will feel disaffected. Yet, for Justice Brennan, the
Establishment Clause was meant to insure “that no American should at
any point feel alienated from his government because that government
has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view
on a matter of religion.” 60
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that Nebraska’s prayer policy created
an “excessive entanglement” between the government and religion. This
program that reimbursed parents for the costs of transporting their children to parochial schools on buses
operated by the public transportation system); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (finding that
beneficial grants for higher education at religious schools were constitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that a state statute exempting religious institutions
from real property tax was constitutional).
55. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (holding that the “pre-eminent purpose” of a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms was “plainly
religious in nature” despite the legislature’s professed secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107–09 (1968) (striking down a state statute banning the teaching of evolution in public schools
because of its primarily religious purpose); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223–24 (1963) (finding that a public school’s practice of starting each day with a Bible reading and
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
56. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
58. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (quoting Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982)).
60. Id. at 805–06. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from “send[ing] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community”).
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entanglement took two forms. First, the government “program might
involve the state impermissibly in monitoring and overseeing religious
affairs” by requiring the state to select an appropriate chaplain and to
monitor that person to make sure that person gives prayers that conform
to the requirements of the Establishment Clause. 61 Second, legislative
prayer results in entanglement because of its “divisive political
potential,” which creates controversy along religious lines. 62
Moreover, in applying Lemon to legislative prayer, Justice Brennan
highlighted a central disagreement regarding the purpose of the
Establishment Clause. Whereas the majority focused on the history at
the time of and subsequent to the drafting of the First Amendment,
Justice Brennan relied on a much broader history—the frequently
violent history of sixteenth and seventeenth century England and
Europe: “The Establishment Clause embodies a judgment, born of a
long and turbulent history, that, in our society, religion ‘must be a
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
private choice . . . .’” 63 Because religion is a private matter, the
government should not and cannot interject itself into religious affairs
such as legislative prayers. According to Justice Brennan, the
Establishment Clause requires the government to remain neutral
between and among religions as well as between religion and nonreligion: “‘Government in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may
not . . . aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another. . . . The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and nonreligion.’” 64 As a result, while the majority
would allow legislative prayers unless there was evidence that the
government intended to proselytize or advance a particular religion
through the invocations, 65 the dissent would “strike[e] down all official
legislative invocations.” 66
The contrast between the majority and Justice Brennan is instructive
for at least two reasons. First, it clarifies the majority’s “intent” test by
showing what it does not mean. Because the Establishment Clause
allows for legislative prayer, the majority necessarily rejected Justice
Brennan’s claim that such prayers are unconstitutional because they
“explicitly link religious belief [and] the power and prestige of the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798–99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 802 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)).
Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968)).
Id. at 794–95 (majority opinion).
Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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State . . . ‘in the minds of some.’” 67 The majority declined to apply
Lemon’s effect prong because the Establishment Clause analysis does
not depend on the effect of the government practice on the minds of
third party observers. That some, “like respondent, believe that to have
prayer in this context risks the beginning of the establishment . . . is not
well founded [because] [t]he unbroken practice for two centuries in the
National Congress . . . gives abundant assurance that there is no real
threat ‘while this Court sits.’” 68 Even though the majority and dissent
agreed that “the federal judiciary should not sit as a board of censors on
individual prayers,” they disagreed regarding the best way to avoid the
government’s taking on such a role. 69 Whereas the dissent avoided the
problem by prohibiting legislative prayer, the majority relied on the
judiciary to monitor and assess the reasons for the government’s actions
as opposed to the content of specific prayers. Regardless of the effect of
the legislative prayer on adults, who are assumed capable of warding off
the dual threats of religious indoctrination and peer pressure, 70 the
majority interpreted the Establishment Clause to generally allow for
legislative prayer, thereby avoiding the need to review the content of
individual prayers.
Second, Justice Brennan’s dissent demonstrates why the Court’s
subsequent adoption of the endorsement test further limits the apparent
67. Id. at 798. The dissent’s “explicit linking” test still survives, at least in some opinions.
Recently, the Middle District of North Carolina reintroduced the Marsh dissenters’ test in a challenge to
sectarian invocations given at the start of County Commissioner meetings in Forsyth County, North
Carolina. Instead of applying Marsh, the district judge claimed that the central inquiry is whether the
sectarian invocations “have the effect of affiliating the Government with that particular faith or belief.”
Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009) (on appeal to
the Fourth Circuit) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
603 (1989)). That is, the court limited Marsh to nonsectarian invocations and reverted back to the
endorsement test (the modern incarnation of Lemon) when analyzing sectarian legislative prayer.
Because it rejected the “effect of linking” test, Marsh also is inconsistent with the district court’s test as
well.
68. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. The majority did not rely on the dissent’s school prayer cases because the “heightened
concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools” do not apply in the legislative prayer context where the listeners are adults
who are free to come and go as they please. Id. at 792 (majority opinion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 596–97 (1992) (“Inherent differences between the public school system and a session of a state
legislature distinguish this case from Marsh. . . . The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state
legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most important for the student to
attend.”). Id. See also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 287 (1990) (“We
have always treated with special sensitivity the Establishment Clause problems that result when
religious observances are moved into the public schools.”); Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84
(1987) (“The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment
Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”).
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scope of Marsh. As a majority of the Court started to apply the
“reasonable observer” standard, Marsh’s rejection of such a standard
looked more like a historical aberration instead of a general test for
facially religious government speech. This tension became apparent in
Allegheny, which is the focus of the next subpart.
B. The Rise of the Endorsement Test—Legislative Prayer Gets Stuck in
the Marsh
In the wake of Marsh, the Court struggled to cobble together a
majority that could agree on the appropriate Establishment Clause test.
The dissenters in Marsh sought to limit Marsh to legislative prayers and
sought to apply Lemon more broadly in other contexts. But with the
addition of Justices Scalia and Kennedy to the Court in the 1980s,
Lemon received greater scrutiny. 71 In response to these criticisms,
Justice O’Connor started articulating her endorsement test, most
prominently in holiday display cases, such as Lynch v. Donnelly. 72 And
by 1989, a majority of the Court adopted her endorsement test in
Allegheny. But in addition to creating a new Establishment Clause test,
Allegheny marked an important shift away from Marsh. Whereas
Justice Kennedy, writing for the four dissenters in Allegheny, would
have extended Marsh to give “government some latitude in recognizing
and accommodating the central role religion pays in our society,” 73 the
majority sought to limit Marsh to the “unique history” that justified
nonsectarian legislative prayers. 74 As a result, although Allegheny
involved neither legislative prayers nor government speech, 75 it affirmed
71. As has been well-documented, the Lemon test has been the object of much criticism from
within and without the Court. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“I have to this
point assumed the validity of the Lemon ‘purpose’ test. In fact, however, I think the pessimistic
evaluation that THE CHIEF JUSTICE made of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the
‘purpose’ prong: it is ‘a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks
to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is not surprising . . . that our most recent
opinions have expressed doubt on the usefulness of the Lemon test.”); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct.
1803, 1819 (2010) (applying the endorsement test but expressing doubt that the “reasonable observer”
test is appropriate for Establishment Clause review); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 14–15 (2d ed. 1988).
72. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a Christmas display that included
a crèche as well as other traditional holiday symbols such as reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas
tree, carolers, a teddy bear, and hundreds of colored lights, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
73. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 658 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this
principle because the particular chaplain ‘had removed all references to Christ.’”) (citation omitted).
75. See, e.g., id. at 600–01 (“On the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government
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the dissent’s view in Marsh that Marsh is a narrow exception to the
Establishment Clause.
In Allegheny, the Court considered whether two holiday displays—a
crèche on the main staircase of a public courthouse and a display on a
sidewalk comprised of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a salute to
liberty sign—violated the Establishment Clause. Rejecting Marsh, a
majority of the Court applied the endorsement test. Unlike Marsh’s
intent test, the endorsement test “preclude[s] government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” 76 The central inquiry
under the endorsement test, therefore, is whether the government signals
to observers that it is conveying a message of endorsement: “The effect
of the display depends upon the message that the government’s practice
communicates: the question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand to be
the purpose of the display.’” 77 If a reasonable observer, who is aware of
the history and context surrounding the government action, would view
that action as conveying a message that the government favors or
disfavors religion generally or a particular sect over others, 78 then the
action violates the Establishment Clause. 79 If the message has “the
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’” religion over nonreligion or a specific
faith to a hypothetical reasonable observer,80 then the government’s
action is unconstitutional.
Applying this test to the holiday displays in Allegheny, the Court held
that the crèche had the “effect of promoting or endorsing religious
beliefs” but that the Christmas tree and menorah did not. 81 But, more
is endorsing the religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of its
own. . . . Thus, by prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits
precisely what occurred here: the government’s lending its support to the communication of a religious
organization’s religious message.”).
76. Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
77. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); id. at 620 (“[T]he
constitutionality of [the display’s] effect must also be judged according to the standard of a ‘reasonable
observer . . . .’”).
78. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (questioning the endorsement test but
acknowledging that the endorsement test “requires the hypothetical construct of an objective observer
who knows all of the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement”).
79. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“It is for this reason that the reasonable
observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community
and forum in which the religious display appears. As I explained in Allegheny, ‘the “history and
ubiquity” of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.’”)
(citation omitted).
80. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
81. Id. at 621. Justice Blackmun, however, did not take the endorsement test to supplant Lemon
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importantly for present purposes, the Court also distinguished Marsh in
response to Justice Kennedy’s dissent. Contrary to the majority, Justice
Kennedy rejected the endorsement test as “flawed in its fundamentals
and unworkable in practice.” 82 In its place, Justice Kennedy advocated
Marsh’s historical approach: “the meaning of the [Establishment] Clause
is to be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings” and “must permit not only legitimate practices two
centuries old but also any other practices with no greater potential for an
establishment of religion.” 83 Given the history of “[g]overnment
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for
religion,” 84 the Establishment Clause must be understood to allow the
government to accommodate and promote legislative prayer as well as
other religious practices and displays, such as the crèche and menorah:
In permitting the displays on government property of the menorah and the
crèche, the city and county sought to do no more than “celebrate the
season,” and to acknowledge, along with many of their citizens, the
historical background and the religious, as well as secular, nature of the
Chanukah and Christmas holidays. 85

Consistent with Marsh, Justice Kennedy took the government’s intent—
what it “sought to do”—to be critical when deciding whether the
government’s accommodation of religion transgresses the Establishment
Clause. Because legislative prayer is consistent with the Establishment
Clause even though it might engender “feelings of exclusion,” 86 Justice
Kennedy argued that the government can engage in a broad array of
religious activity without violating the Establishment Clause. 87
In responding to Justice Kennedy, the majority limited Marsh in two
primary ways. First, the Court expressly attempted to confine Marsh’s
historical reasoning to nonsectarian legislative prayer. Although history
“may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion
by the government,” the history upon which Justice Kennedy relies

and left open the possibility that the menorah display might violate the purpose and entanglement prongs
of Lemon. Id.
82. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 670.
84. Id. at 657.
85. Id. at 663 (citation omitted); see also id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“Justice Kennedy,
however, argues that Marsh legitimates all ‘practices with no greater potential for an establishment of
religion’ than those ‘accepted traditions dating back to the Founding.’” (citations omitted)).
86. Id. at 673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 665 (“If Congress and the state legislatures do not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause when they begin each day with a state-sponsored prayer for divine guidance offered by a
chaplain whose salary is paid at government expense, I cannot comprehend how a menorah or a crèche,
displayed in the limited context of the holiday season, can be invalid.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
G-GAYLORD

1036

8/4/2011 2:15:21 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

“cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government’s
allegiance to a particular sect or creed.” 88 Second, the Court interpreted
Marsh through the lens of the newly adopted endorsement test:
Marsh itself . . . recognized that not even the “unique history” of
legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have
the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or
belief. The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this
principle because the particular chaplain had “removed all references to
Christ.” 89

Under this view, the endorsement test’s “effect of affiliating”
requirement sets out the general Establishment Clause rule, and Marsh is
simply an exception to that rule.
Given its “unique history,”
nonsectarian legislative prayers survive Establishment Clause review,
but the majority did not even consider Marsh’s intent test.
To limit Marsh in this manner, however, the Allegheny majority
significantly re-characterized the reasoning in Marsh. In fact, it
interpreted Marsh according to a test that Marsh refused to apply.
Recall that Justice Brennan would have struck down Nebraska’s prayer
policy because the “invocations . . . explicitly link religious belief and
observance to the power and prestige of the State.” 90 But the “effect of
linking” test is just the “effect of affiliating” requirement that the
Allegheny majority applied to Marsh. Under both tests, “the government
[must] remain secular, rather than affiliate itself with religious beliefs or
institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating among citizens on
the basis of their religious faiths.” 91
The problem is that if the Marsh majority took this to be the proper
test, Marsh would have been decided differently. After all, as Justice
Kennedy acknowledged, legislative prayer, whether nondenominational
or not, affiliates the government with religious beliefs at some level. 92
88. Id. at 603 (majority opinion).
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610; see also id. at 612 (“And once the judgment has been made that a
particular proclamation of Christian belief, when disseminated from a particular location on government
property, has the effect of demonstrating the government’s endorsement of Christian faith, then it
necessarily follows that the practice must be enjoined to protect the constitutional rights of those citizens
who follow some creed other than Christianity.”).
92. Justice Kennedy expressed this concern (that the majority’s interpretation of Marsh in
Allegheny is inconsistent with Marsh) in a slightly different way:
The majority suggests that our approval of legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers is
to be distinguished from these cases on the ground that legislative prayer is nonsectarian,
while crèches and menorahs are not. In the first place, of course, this purported
distinction is utterly inconsistent with the majority’s belief that the Establishment Clause
“mean[s] no official preference even for religion over nonreligion.”
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But Marsh does not consider the effect of the legislative prayers on third
party listeners; rather, Marsh focuses on the government’s intent—
whether it sought to exploit the prayer opportunity to proselytize or
advance a particular faith (a standard that is noticeably lacking from the
Allegheny majority’s discussion of Marsh). Thus, by explaining Marsh
through the filter of Allegheny, Allegheny promotes the view—suggested
by Justice Brennan at the very beginning of his Marsh dissent 93 —that
Marsh is an exception to the Establishment Clause and is justified only
because of the “unique history” of nonsectarian invocations. And, as the
Court has applied the endorsement test more frequently, Marsh has
continued to be viewed as a historical aberration. But two recent events
have altered the status of Marsh yet again—the balance of the Court
shifted with the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and
the Court decided Summum, which reevaluated the standard for facially
religious government speech.
II. MARSH, SUMMUM, AND SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
The status of legislative prayers is uncertain under Marsh and
Allegheny. Allegheny precludes “official preference even for religion
over nonreligion.” 94 But legislative prayers do just that. And under
Marsh, such prayers are constitutional. So after Allegheny, are only
some types of legislative prayers constitutional and, if so, which ones?
Whereas Marsh provided a test to distinguish between constitutional and
unconstitutional prayers, Allegheny does not. Does Allegheny therefore
overrule the Marsh test or simply limit Marsh to nonsectarian
invocations?
Without additional guidance from the Court, lower courts have
struggled to decide how Marsh applies to the variety of prayers that have
been used to open federal, state, and local governmental meetings.
Because Allegheny noted that the minister in Marsh “removed all
references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator,” 95
some lower courts interpreted Marsh to allow only nonsectarian
legislative prayers. But nothing in Marsh or Allegheny precludes
sectarian invocations because such prayers were not before the Court in
either case. Moreover, if the government does not use the prayer
opportunity to proselytize, promote, or disparage any specific religion,
Id. at 665 n.4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 673 (“If the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect
individuals from mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer cannot escape invalidation.”).
93. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605.
95. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14.
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then Marsh precludes a court’s parsing the content of the prayer. As a
result, sectarian prayers might be constitutional under Marsh.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Summum provides
courts with new guidance by clarifying the relationship between facially
religious government speech, the Free Speech Clause, and the
Establishment Clause. And, in the process, Summum sets the stage for a
broader application of Marsh in Establishment Clause cases.
A. The Circuit Split
Although Marsh was decided in 1983, circuit courts have only
recently confronted the constitutional problems presented by sectarian
legislative prayers. As the use of legislative invocations grew, so did the
public attention that these prayers received. To date, however, the
circuit courts have not come close to reaching a consensus on the
governing Establishment Clause standard in such cases. Drawing on
Marsh and Allegheny, the circuits are splintered on the constitutionality
of sectarian legislative prayer. While the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
have indicated that sectarian prayer policies can survive Establishment
Clause review, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have refused to “extend”
Marsh to sectarian prayers. Moreover, an en banc panel of the Fifth
Circuit, unable to cobble together a majority to decide these questions on
the merits, dismissed a challenge to sectarian invocations on standing
grounds. The Seventh Circuit followed suit, dismissing a similar action
for lack of taxpayer standing. As a result, these cases illustrate the
tensions that have developed as courts try to reconcile Marsh and
Allegheny and provide a background to better understand how
Summum’s government speech doctrine requires courts to apply Marsh’s
impermissible intent test when deciding Establishment Clause
challenges to facially religious government speech. 96

96. Three other circuits—the Second, Third, and Eighth—have mentioned Marsh in passing but
have not yet decided a case directly dealing with legislative prayer practices. See, e.g., Commack SelfServ. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 430 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying Lemon but explaining
that Marsh permitted Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy because it “did not confer a substantial and
impermissible benefit on religion in general or on Christianity in particular”); Freethought Soc’y of
Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to apply Marsh to a Ten
Commandments display but stating that “the Supreme Court has acknowledged the proposition that
history can transform the effect of a religious practice”); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419
F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has approved certain government activity that directly or
indirectly recognizes the role of religion in our national life.”).
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1. Eleventh Circuit—Marsh and Allegheny Permit Sectarian Legislative
Prayers
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit considered sectarian invocations in
Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Georgia. 97 The taxpayer plaintiffs in
Pelphrey challenged the policy of starting the meetings of two
commissions, the Cobb County Commission and the Cobb County
Planning Commission, with a prayer. Pursuant to long-standing
practice, each commission allowed volunteer clergy from various
religions and other members of the community to provide an invocation
at the beginning of its meetings. The clergy who offered the invocations
represented a variety of faiths, including Christianity, Islam, Unitarian
Universalism, and Judaism, and because neither of the commissions
composed or censored the prayers, many of the prayers included
sectarian references. 98 In particular, “[t]he prayers have included
references to ‘Jesus,’ ‘Allah,’ ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,’
‘Mohammed,’ and ‘Heavenly Father.’” 99 Although the commissions
used clergy volunteers on a rotating basis, the majority of speakers were
Christian, “reflect[ing] the composition of the religious institutions in
Cobb County.” 100
After the commissions refused the American Civil Liberties Union’s
request to stop allowing invocational speakers to make sectarian
references in the opening prayers, the plaintiffs sued, asking the district
court to find the sectarian invocations unconstitutional and to enjoin the
practice.
Although the district court held that the Planning
Commission’s selection process in 2003–04 violated the Establishment
Clause, the court otherwise upheld the use of invocations at the meetings
of both commissions. 101

97. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th. Cir. 2008).
98. According to the panel in Pelphrey, between 1998 and 2008, “70 percent of prayers before
the County Commission and 68 percent of prayers before the Planning Commission contained Christian
references.” Id. at 1267.
99. Id. at 1266.
100. Id. at 1267. According to the plaintiffs, the vast majority—96.6%—of the clergy who gave
invocations at the meetings were Christian, which they claimed demonstrated a violation of the
endorsement test. Id.
101. The evidence showed that in 2003–04 the Planning Commission relied on the Yellow Pages
when selecting clergy to provide the invocation and that the deputy clerk had drawn a line through
several categories of churches in the Yellow Pages, including “Churches-Islamic,” “Churches-Jehovah’s
Witnesses,” “Churches-Jewish,” and “Churches-Latter Day Saints.” Not surprisingly, then, “[n]o clergy
from those subcategories were asked to provide the invocation during 2003–2004.” Id. at 1267–68.
Accordingly, the district court held that the 2003–04 selection process was unconstitutional, relying on
Marsh’s admonition that appointment cannot “stem[] from an impermissible motive.” Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Specifically, the circuit
court held that the sectarian prayers in Pelphrey were constitutional,
given the “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years”
of legislative prayer upon which the Court relied so heavily in Marsh; 102
and the Marsh majority’s insistence that “‘[t]he content of the prayer is
not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one . . . faith or belief.’” 103 Because there was no evidence that either
commission sought to use the invocations to proselytize or promote one
religion over another, the Eleventh Circuit declined the invitation “to
parse the content of a particular prayer.” 104 As a result, the prayers at
commission meetings, even though frequently sectarian, did not violate
the Establishment Clause.
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, although the Court’s
decisions in Allegheny and Lee v. Weisman 105 “provide insight about the
boundaries for legislative prayer,” 106 they did not change the result. In
particular, Pelphrey took Allegheny to be consistent with “the lesson of
Marsh that legislative prayers should not ‘demonstrate a [government]
preference for one particular sect or creed.’” 107 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, Allegheny did not mandate that all prayers be
nondenominational, only that they “do not ‘have the effect of affiliating
the government with any one specific faith or belief.’” 108 Lee, in turn,
“clarified that the government ordinarily should have no role in
determining the content of public prayers,” 109 which is consistent with
Marsh’s prohibiting judicial review of the content of such prayers absent
evidence of an impermissible motive. 110 Thus, even under Allegheny’s
“effect of affiliating test,” the Eleventh Circuit found the prayers
constitutional. Because the prayers did not show that the government
preferred one particular creed or sect over another, the court could not
102. Id. at 792.
103. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95). The dissent in Pelphrey,
echoing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marsh, argued that the sectarian prayers violated Lemon: “It would
be incredulous to argue any purpose other than a religious one for ‘invoking divine guidance’ upon the
commissions. . . . It is equally axiomatic that the primary effect of the prayers is to advance religion.”
Id. at 1283 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting). Of course, Marsh rejected this line of argument, as did the
majority in Pelphrey.
104. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
105. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting school from inviting local clergy members to give
nonsectarian prayers at public school graduations).
106. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270.
107. Id. at 1272.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1271.
110. Id.
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(and did not) “‘embark on a sensitive evaluation or [] parse the content
of a particular prayer.’” 111
2. Fifth and Seventh Circuits—No Standing, No Decision on the Merits
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Pelphrey did not draw on a
consensus among its sister circuits. In fact, the other circuits that have
heard challenges to sectarian invocations have reached widely different
conclusions. For example, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits issued initial
panel opinions prohibiting sectarian prayer practices but ultimately
dismissed the actions on standing grounds. As a result, neither circuit
has issued a binding precedent on the underlying Establishment Clause
issues.
In Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 112 the Fifth Circuit heard
a challenge to the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s practice of opening
its meetings with prayer. Although the original panel was splintered,
with each of the three judges writing separately regarding the proper
Establishment Clause standard, the court held in a 2–1 opinion that the
prayer policy was unconstitutional. 113 But that decision was quickly
vacated when the court granted rehearing en banc. In an 8–7 ruling, the
en banc panel remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the case for lack of taxpayer standing. 114 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of the school board’s particular
prayer policy.
Although following a slightly different path, the Seventh Circuit
eventually reached the same conclusion. In an action to stop Indiana’s
188 year practice of beginning its legislative sessions with a prayer, the
original panel upheld an injunction against the practice, holding that
Marsh “hinge[d] on the nonsectarian” nature of the legislative
prayers. 115 Unlike Marsh, the invocations were not given by the same
person; rather, clergy from different religions and some state
representatives delivered the prayers. In addition, many of the prayers
contained sectarian references to Jesus, Christ, God, Almighty God, or
Heavenly Father. 116
Because the invocations included sectarian
references, the panel denied the motion for stay pending appeal. When

111. Id. at 1272 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795).
112. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006).
113. Id.
114. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe II), 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
115. Hinrichs v. Bosma (Hinrichs I), 440 F.3d 393, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2006).
116. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II),
506 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 2007).
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the appeal of the original action was finally heard, however, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the injunction and, following the Fifth Circuit in Doe II,
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing
because “[t]he plaintiffs have not tied their status as taxpayers to the
House’s allegedly unconstitutional practice of regularly offering a
sectarian prayer.” 117
3. Sixth and Ninth Circuits—School Prayer and an Unpublished
Decision
Unlike the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, other circuits have reached the
merits and issued opinions contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Pelphrey. In particular, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have stated that
sectarian references in legislative prayers violate the Establishment
Clause. These decisions are of only modest help in determining the
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayer, however, because neither
circuit’s opinion addressed the issue in a manner that constitutes a
binding precedent. In 1987, before the Supreme Court decided
Allegheny or Lee, the Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community
School, 118 had to resolve a challenge to sectarian references at a public
school graduation. The court interpreted Marsh to allow only
nonsectarian prayers. 119
Of course, the Supreme Court in Lee
subsequently distinguished prayers in public schools from those given at
the start of legislative sessions: “[i]nherent differences between the
public school system and a session of a state legislature distinguish this
case from Marsh.” 120 Thus, the fact that sectarian and nonsectarian
prayers are not permitted at high school graduations does not mean that
such prayers violate the Establishment Clause when given at the start of
legislative meetings. That is, given that Lee precludes all prayers at
graduations, it is unremarkable that the Sixth Circuit found graduation
invocations that “employ[ed] the language of Christian theology and
prayer” unconstitutional. 121
Yet, as Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Allegheny and his opinion in
Salazar suggest, the current Supreme Court is apt to apply Marsh more
broadly outside the school context: “The goal of avoiding governmental
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the
public realm. . . . The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 599.
822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1409.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992).
Stein, F.2d at 1410.
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any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.” 122 Thus,
because the Sixth Circuit’s decision predated important Supreme Court
cases and because the Supreme Court has subsequently distinguished
between graduation and legislative settings, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion
in Stein does not shed much light on the current status of sectarian
invocations.
Similarly, although the Ninth Circuit decided a sectarian prayer case,
its opinion does not provide useful guidance with respect to legislative
invocations for two reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bacus
v. Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education 123 is
unpublished and, therefore, is not binding precedent under either the
Federal Rules of Procedure or the Ninth Circuit’s local rules. 124 Second,
in Bacus, the Ninth Circuit considered sectarian prayers that were
offered at school board meetings. Given Marsh, the Ninth Circuit
determined that it did not need to address whether school board
meetings were more similar to legislative sessions or classroom prayers.
Because the “same individual almost always offered the invocation,
always ‘in the Name of Jesus,’ and no individuals of other religions ever
gave the invocation[s],” 125 the prayer practice advanced one faith or
belief over others in violation of Marsh, regardless of the nature of the
school board. The panel, however, expressly left open the question
“whether the prayers ‘in the Name of Jesus,’ would be a permissible
solemnization of a legislature-like body, provided that invocations were,
as is traditional in Congress, rotated among leaders of different faiths,
sects, and denominations.” 126 As a result, whether sectarian legislative
prayer violates the Establishment Clause still is an open question in the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. 127

122. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
123. 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision).
124. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as
‘unpublished,’ . . . or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a)
(“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the
doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”).
125. Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 356–57.
126. Id. at 356.
127. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II),
506 F.3d 584, 604 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting).
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4. Fourth and Tenth Circuits—Selecting and Rejecting Invocational
Speakers
Although most of the circuit court cases have challenged the
constitutionality of the prayer policies themselves, the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits have heard claims testing the process by which invocational
speakers are selected. In Marsh, the repeated reappointment of the same
Presbyterian minister did not violate the Establishment Clause absent
proof of an “impermissible motive.” 128 But is the test the same when
the government refuses to allow someone to give an invocation? Given
the limited number of meetings each year, it may be impossible to give
everyone the opportunity to lead a prayer at the start of a meeting. But
then how must the government choose between the different speakers?
In Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 129 an en banc panel of the Tenth
Circuit upheld a city council’s decision to deny a citizen’s request to
give an invocation. 130 Pursuant to its policy, the city council sent a form
letter to local religious groups asking if they would like to give an
opening prayer. In response to this request, various religious leaders,
including members of Jewish, Christian, Zen Buddhist, and Native
American traditions, gave invocations at city council meetings. The
plaintiff, Tom Snyder, “draft[ed] a prayer that calls on public officials to
cease the practice of using religion in public affairs.” 131 In particular,
Mr. Snyder’s “prayer” included the following:
“We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-using
the name of God in conducting government meetings; and, that you lead
them away from the hypocritical and blasphemous deception of the
public, attempting to make the people believe that bureaucrats’ decisions
and actions have thy stamp of approval if prayers are offered at the
beginning of government meetings.” 132

Viewing Marsh as a limited exception, the court noted that “the
constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.” 133
As a result, because the traditional rules did not apply, Marsh did not
require the government to open the prayer opportunity to everyone who
wanted to participate: “The Establishment Clause and Marsh simply do
not require that a legislative body ensure a kind of equal public access to

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1228 n.3.
Id. at 1232.
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a legislative body’s program of invocational prayers.” 134 Rather, in
permitting invocations, Marsh necessarily granted a legislative body the
authority to select who would give the prayers, be it the same
Presbyterian minister in Marsh or a variety of local religious leaders in
Snyder. Provided the method of selection did not violate the
Constitution, the exclusion of some willing speakers created no
Establishment Clause problem: “if Marsh allows a legislative body to
select a speaker for its invocational prayers, then it also allows the
legislative body to exclude other speakers.” 135
Even though courts cannot parse the content of the prayer, Marsh did
not prevent the city council from evaluating the proposed prayer to
insure that it did not “‘proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or
belief.’” 136 Because “all prayers ‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in
one way or another,” the government can exclude certain “faith[s] or
belief[s]” and permit others without violating the Establishment
Clause. 137 Provided that the overall selection process does not evince an
improper motive, the city council can reject a prayer that “aggressively
proselytizes for his particular religious views and strongly disparages
other religious views.” 138 Moreover, because the prayers in Marsh were
“Judeo–Christian,” the Tenth Circuit held that the Establishment Clause
cannot be read to prohibit any and all prayers that appeal to “particular
concept[s] of God.” 139 Thus, under the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, where
there is no evidence that the government intended to proselytize or to
select a speaker for an impermissible motive, sectarian legislative prayer
would survive Establishment Clause review.
In a series of cases, the Fourth Circuit considered challenges to both
prayer policies and selection procedures, reaching different conclusions
based on the facts of each case. 140 In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls,
South Carolina, 141 the Fourth Circuit analyzed prayers at the start of city
council meetings. 142 Unlike the prayer policy in Snyder, the Town of

134. Id. at 1233.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1234.
137. Id. at 1234 n.10.
138. Id. at 1234 n.10, 1235.
139. Id. at 1234 n.10. See also Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276,
285 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A party challenging a legislative invocation practice cannot, therefore, rely on the
mere fact that the selecting authority chose a representative of a particular faith, because some adherent
or representative of some faith will invariably give the invocation.”).
140. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (“[T]he inquiry calls for line-drawing; no
fixed, per se rule can be framed.”).
141. 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
142. Id.
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Great Falls did not invite various religious leaders from the community
to lead the prayers, relying instead on the council members themselves.
Because the council members were Christian, the prayers frequently
referred to “Jesus,” “Jesus Christ,” or “Savior,” and those in attendance
customarily stood or bowed their heads during the prayers. When the
plaintiff, Ms. Wynne, complained about such sectarian references, the
council did not change its policy. Instead, council members solicited
support for the practice from local ministers, singled Ms. Wynne out for
failing to participate in the prayers, and refused to allow her to speak at a
meeting even though she was listed on the agenda. 143 Others in
attendance also made Ms. Wynne feel uncomfortable and unwelcome at
the meetings. 144 Under these circumstances, the panel found that “the
record . . . is replete with powerful ‘indication[s]’ that the Town Council
did indeed ‘exploit’ the prayer opportunity ‘to proselytize or advance’
one faith.” 145 In addition, interpreting Marsh through the lens of
Allegheny, the court found the practice unconstitutional because the
government made religion relevant to Ms. Wynne’s political standing in
the community by “advanc[ing] its own religious views in preference to
all others.” 146 Thus, although some forms of sectarian prayer might
survive Establishment Clause review, this particular policy did not. 147
One year later, in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors, 148 the Fourth Circuit upheld a prayer policy pursuant to
which the county invited clergy from a “wide cross-section of the
County’s religious leaders,” including rabbis, imams, priests, pastors,
and ministers, to provide “a wide variety of prayers” at the county
meetings. 149
Reflecting the county’s attempt to promote
“nonsectarianism,” the prayers included “wide and embracive” sectarian
references to “‘Lord God, our creator,’ ‘giver and sustainer of life,’ ‘the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob,’ ‘the God of Abraham, of Moses,
Jesus, and Mohammad,’ ‘Heavenly Father,’ [and] ‘Lord of Lords, King
of Kings, creator of planet Earth and the universe and our own

143. Id. at 295.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 298 n.4.
146. Id. at 302. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 595 (1989).
147. See, e.g., Wynne, 376 F.3d at 300 n.5. But the court also suggests that Marsh might be
limited to nonsectarian prayer by (1) distinguishing Snyder’s claim that the Establishment Clause
prohibited only the “more aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization,” and (2) stating that
prayers “[n]ot ‘all prayers’ ‘“advance” a particular faith.’ Rather, nonsectarian prayers, by definition, do
not advance a particular faith.” Id. at 301 n.6.
148. 404 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005).
149. Id. at 284–85.
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creator.’” 150 Unlike Wynne, where the “pervasively and exclusively
sectarian” nature of the prayers “undermined . . . participation by person
of all faiths in public life,” 151 the diversity of religious speakers and
prayers in Simpson fell within “the spacious boundaries” set forth in
Marsh. 152 Furthermore, the policy did not violate the Free Speech
Clause because the prayers were government speech “‘subject only to
the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause.’” 153 But the county’s
policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was “in many
ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh Court” and
because prohibiting such a policy “would push localities intent on
avoiding litigation to select only one minister from only one faith
[making] America and its public events more insular and sectarian rather
than less so.” 154
Finally, in Turner v. City Council of City of Fredericksburg,
Virginia, 155 the Fourth Circuit, with Justice O’Connor sitting by
designation and writing for the court, upheld the city’s decision to deny
a council member’s request to offer a sectarian prayer at a city council
meeting. 156 Because the city’s prayer policy allowed only nonsectarian
prayers, the Fourth Circuit did not have to decide whether the
Establishment Clause might permit sectarian references under certain
circumstances. 157 Rather, the panel had to decide only whether the
government could limit the opening invocation to nondenominational
prayers. The panel held that it could, given that the policy “is designed
to make the prayers accessible to people who come from a variety of
backgrounds, not to exclude or disparage a particular faith.” 158
The Fourth Circuit currently is considering Joyner v. Forsyth
County, 159 which asks the court to determine the constitutionally of a
policy that permits sectarian legislative prayer. Pursuant to its policy,
the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners invites religious leaders
from the community to give an invocation “according to the dictates of

150. Id. at 284.
151. Id. at 283.
152. Id. at 284.
153. Id. at 288 (quoting Rosenberger Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820
(1995)).
154. Id. at 285, 287.
155. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 356 (“We need not decide whether the Establishment Clause compelled the Council
to adopt their legislative prayer policy, because the Establishment Clause does not absolutely dictate the
form of legislative prayer.”).
158. Id. at 356.
159. No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *2 (M.D.N.C Nov. 9, 2009).
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[each leader’s] own conscience,” provided the prayer does not
proselytize or disparage any other faith. 160 The invocations frequently
contain references to “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Trinity.” Thus, the court
will have to decide whether sectarian references violate the
Establishment Clause.
But even under the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of Marsh, Forsyth County’s policy might survive
Establishment Clause review. In Turner, the court invoked Marsh for
the proposition that “courts ought not to ‘parse the content of a particular
prayer’” if “the prayer is not used to advance a particular religion or
disparage another faith or belief.” 161 But, as Pelphrey acknowledged,
this standard is consistent with some forms of sectarian prayer. Where,
as in Simpson and Pelphrey, the government invites a wide range of
clergy to offer a wide range of prayers from their respective faith
perspectives, such a prayer policy “recognize[s] the rich religious
heritage of our country in a fashion that was designed to include
members of the community, rather than to proselytize.” 162
Accordingly, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit, might allow sectarian references under Marsh, even
though these courts have viewed Marsh as an exception rather than as
setting out a separate Establishment Clause test. But if Marsh now has
the broader scope for which Justices Kennedy and Scalia argued in their
Allegheny dissent, then sectarian prayer should fit more comfortably
within the “spacious boundaries” of the Establishment Clause, and, as
this Article argues below, Summum dictates just this result.
B. Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine—Marsh Makes a
Comeback
To date, only two of the circuit court cases discussing legislative
prayer have mentioned the government speech doctrine. Both were
decided by the Fourth Circuit, and both treated the Free Speech analysis
as separate and distinct from the Establishment Clause review. 163 In
2009, however, the Supreme Court decided Summum v. Pleasant Grove
City, 164 in which the Court unanimously approved “the recently minted

160. Id. at *2.
161. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009).
162. Id.
163. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2005);
Turner, 534 F.3d at 354–55.
164. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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government speech doctrine.” 165 Pursuant to this doctrine, government
speech is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 166 When
speaking, the government can “‘say what it wants’” to insure that its
desired message is communicated. 167 And because the message is its
own, it can speak without worrying about how third parties might
interpret that message.
Despite being a Free Speech case, Summum directly impacts the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Although Justice Souter
claimed that “[t]he interaction between the ‘government speech
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun
to be worked out,” 168 this position ignores Marsh, in which the Court
approved legislative prayers—a specific form of facially religious
government speech. In Allegheny, the Court did not consider the
standard for government speech because the town simply gave
preferential access to a private religious speaker instead of
communicating its own message. 169 Summum, however, speaks directly
to religious government speech and requires courts to apply Marsh’s
intent test.
Under Marsh, legislative prayers are constitutional unless the
government has an “impermissible motive,” i.e., the intent to
“proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.” 170 Given the government’s right to control its message, the
constitutionality of its speech is not determined by a reasonable third
party observer; rather, courts must determine whether the government’s
motive was impermissibly religious. Thus, with respect to legislative
prayers, courts must determine whether the invocations are government
speech or private speech so that they may decide which test—
impermissible religious purpose or endorsement—to apply to the
legislative invocations.

165. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 1131 (“The Free Speech clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech.”).
167. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000)).
168. Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
169. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (“On
the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious message of that
organization, rather than communicating a message of its own.”).
170. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
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1. Summum and the Control Test for Government Speech
In Summum, the Supreme Court considered whether Pleasant Grove
City could refuse to display in a park a monument containing the Seven
Aphorisms of the Summum religion when it already displayed a
monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments. In holding that the
city could accept some facially religious monuments while rejecting
others, the Court unanimously adopted the government speech doctrine.
In particular, the majority held that the government “has the right ‘to
speak for itself’” and that when speaking, the government “‘is entitled to
say what it wishes’” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”171
As a result, “the [g]overnment’s own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.” 172 That is, when speaking, the government can
discriminate based on content and viewpoint. 173
To qualify for the protection afforded by the government speech
doctrine, the government must control the message conveyed: “In this
case, it is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park
represent government speech [because] the City has ‘effectively
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.” 174 Thus, once
the government takes on the role of speaker, the government may claim
the fundamental right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to
choose the content of its message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message.” 175
Thus, for legislative prayer to fall within the government speech
doctrine, the government must have sufficient control over the speech to
send its own message, as opposed to simply facilitating the speech of
private parties. 176 But, under Summum, the government need not create
171. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
172. Id. (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)).
173. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (stating that,
if the government is speaking, “it may make content-based choices”); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc.
v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the government speaks for itself and is not
regulating the speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint . . . .”).
174. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1128 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).
175. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
176. In Turner, the Fourth Circuit suggested that legislative prayers might always be government
speech: “Turner has not cited a single case in which a legislative prayer was treated as individual or
private speech. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has determined that more difficult cases than this one should
be classified as government speech.” Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 355
(4th Cir. 2008). Luther and Caddell argue that, unless the government expressly endorses the prayers,
the prayers “always should be viewed as private speech.” Luther & Caddell, supra note 5, at 596. Thus,
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the invocations to qualify for the protection of the government speech
doctrine; rather, the government can adopt the speech—i.e., the
prayers—that third parties offer at its meetings. As in Summum, by
choosing only “those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose
of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who
frequent the Park . . . [t]he monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.” 177
The same holds true for legislative prayers. By engaging third parties to
give the prayers, the government might convey one or more permissible
messages: “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country” 178 or a desire to “solemniz[e] public
occasions, express[] confidence in the future, and encourag[e] the
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.” 179 But if the
government may convey these messages through Judeo–Christian
prayers given by a Presbyterian minister, the Establishment Clause
should permit the government to send the same messages through a
variety of religious leaders from the local community. Moreover,
provided that the government intends to send a permissible message,
then the “content of the prayer is not of concern to judges.” 180 That is,
Marsh and Summum do not allow courts to distinguish between sectarian
and nonsectarian prayers when the government is speaking directly or
through third parties, absent evidence of improper intent. 181
Of course, Summum does not cite Marsh, so one might wonder
whether there is a meaningful connection between the two cases. After
all, Summum concerns a Free Speech challenge to a facially religious
monument, not an Establishment Clause challenge to government
prayer. But Summum directly impacts the scope of Marsh because
Marsh also involves the intersection of the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses. Just as Marsh acknowledges the special status
of legislative prayers under the Establishment Clause, Summum
recognizes the special status of facially religious government speech
under the Free Exercise Clause. And, unlike Allegheny, which sought to
distinguish legislative prayers from other expressive activity and to limit
not only is the distinction important to the resolution of Establishment Clause challenges to sectarian
legislative prayers, but also it is an unsettled area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
177. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
178. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
179. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
180. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.
181. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Johanns stands for the
proposition that when the government determines an overarching message and retains power to approve
every word disseminated at its behest, the message must be attributed to the government for First
Amendment purposes.”).
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Marsh to nonsectarian prayers in the process, Summum adopts a general
rule that relates directly to Marsh. Under the control test, if the
government engages in speech activity with the intent to send its desired
message, then the speech is government speech: “The City has selected
those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the
Park.” 182
But this is precisely what the Court did in Marsh in the context of the
Establishment Clause; it evaluated the government’s reasons for having
prayer at the start of its meetings. If the government intended “[t]o
invoke Divine guidance on a public body,” such invocations are not an
establishment but only “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country.” 183 Thus, post-Summum, if the
government is determining the message—whether for a legislative
prayer, a holiday display, or a monument in a public park—then, as long
as it does not intend to proselytize or disparage, the government may
rely on history and tradition to insulate its speech from Free Speech and
some Establishment Clause challenges. 184
Put differently, under Marsh and Summum, there is no place for a
“heckler’s veto” with respect to facially religious government speech. 185
Under the Free Speech Clause, third parties who do not like the
government’s message cannot force the government either to remain
silent or to express the third parties’ desired message:
When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines
of political philosophy such as communism and fascism. Petitioners’
assertions ultimately boil down to the position that if the Government
chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous
counterpart rights. But the Court has soundly rejected that proposition. 186

Marsh and Summum hold that the same is true under the Establishment
Clause. When the government engages in legislative prayer, those who
disagree with the message cannot force the government to be silent or to
change its message, no matter how sincere their concerns: “We do not

182. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
183. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
184. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–87 (2005) (plurality opinion) (stating that
the Court’s permitting of the Ten Commandments monument on state grounds was “driven both by the
nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history” and that “[w]e have acknowledged . . . that
‘religion has been closely identified with our history and government’ . . . .”).
185. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (citation omitted).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss3/3

36

Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
G-GAYLORD

2011]

8/4/2011 2:15:21 PM

SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER

1053

doubt the sincerity of those, who like respondent, believe that to have
prayer in this context risks the beginning of the establishment the
Founding Fathers feared. But this concern is not well founded.” 187
Accordingly, despite third party objections, in Summum, the city
could accept and display only those monuments that reflected its chosen
message regarding the history of the community, and in Marsh, the
Nebraska legislature could continue participating in the “unambiguous
and unbroken history of more than 200 years” of legislative prayer. 188
The city, as speaker, was not required to accept monuments from all
donors and could communicate the message that it wanted to send
through the selection of its monuments, including a monument inscribed
with the Ten Commandments.
Similarly, legislatures or other
deliberative bodies are not required to allow all invocational speakers to
deliver an opening prayer and can craft a prayer policy permitting
sectarian or nonsectarian prayer provided that the policy does not stem
from an impermissible motive. That is, the government may engage in a
broader array of government speech without violating the Establishment
Clause. And, if this is correct, then Marsh now has the broader
application for which Justices Kennedy and Scalia argued for in dissent
in Allegheny. That is, post-Summum, the exception has become the rule.
2. Marsh and Summum Preclude Application of the Endorsement Test to
Legislative Prayers
In his Summum concurrence, Justice Souter proposed a “reasonable
observer” test for facially religious government speech. According to
Justice Souter, this test would mirror the endorsement test to provide
“coherence within Establishment Clause law” 189 and would require
courts to determine “whether a reasonable and fully informed observer
would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct
from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the
monument to be placed on public land.” 190 Justice Souter’s reliance on
the endorsement test is misplaced, however, because it focuses on the
wrong person in the communicative process—the observer—instead of
the speaker. Rather than analyze what is critical in the government
speech context—the government’s intent—the endorsement test
considers the effect of the message on a reasonable observer who is
aware of the history and context.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
Id. at 792.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.
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But the government’s reasons for engaging in the speech (e.g.,
solemnizing an event or participating in the long-standing tradition of
legislative prayer) may differ significantly from how others interpret that
message. That is, even though the government controls the content of its
speech, it cannot control how others interpret a monument or other form
of government speech. After all, government speech, such as the
monument in Summum, is not limited to “convey[ing] only one
‘message.’” 191 Those who hear the government’s message may interpret
that message in various ways: “[e]ven when a monument features the
written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may
in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”192
Yet the fact that third parties might ascribe different meanings to the
government’s speech does not change the fact that the government
intended a specific message: “[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and
consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government
entity that accepts and displays such an object may be quite different
from those of either its creator or its donor.” 193
Contrary to Justice Souter, then, the “reasonable observer” test does
not apply to facially religious government speech.
Under the
government speech doctrine, the government has the right to say what it
wants. Under Marsh, the government can “want” to engage in
legislative prayer provided it does not have an improper motive. Thus,
as in Marsh, a court’s Establishment Clause analysis must focus on the
government’s intent when dealing with facially religious government
speech. In fact, if a court requires the government to convey only those
messages that a reasonable observer would view as neutral towards
religion, the government loses the “right to ‘speak for itself.’” 194 Instead
of “say[ing] what it wishes,” the government is forced to filter its speech
to account for how the reasonable observer might interpret the
government’s message—even though, as Summum suggested, such an
observer may interpret the message differently from how the
government intended.
Put differently, the endorsement test presupposes a premise that
Summum and Marsh reject—that the government’s message can be

191. Id. at 1135; Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (“But a Latin cross is not merely
a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic
acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and
its people.”).
192. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
193. Id. at 1136.
194. Id. at 1131.
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determined by the meaning that others attribute to the government, i.e.,
as Allegheny put it, the “effect of the crèche [or other religious display]
on those who viewed it,” 195 or as the district court in Joyner stated, “the
effect of affiliating the Government with that particular faith or
belief.” 196 The government speech doctrine, however, is not predicated
on the “effect” of the government’s speech on others regardless of the
religious/secular or sectarian/nonsectarian nature of that speech.
Because the government is no longer merely facilitating speech but,
instead, engaging in it, the operative question shifts from who is
speaking—private party or the government—to what message the
government intended to convey:
If there is to be assurance that the Establishment Clause retains its
force in guarding against those governmental actions it was intended to
prohibit, we must in each case inquire first into the purpose and object of
the governmental action in question and then into the practical details of
the program’s operation. 197

The investigation into the “purpose and object” of facially religious
government speech, however, is just an inquiry into the government’s
intent in engaging in the speech. Where, as in Marsh, the government
does not attempt to exploit the prayer opportunity, the court does not
concern itself with the content of the prayer. Similarly, if the
government selects invocational speakers without attempting to advance
one faith, there is no Establishment Clause violation: “Absent proof that
the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive,
we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the
Establishment Clause.” 198
Thus, under Marsh and Summum, the focus is not on what a prayer or
monument might mean to a third party observer, but on the
government’s reasons for approving the prayer policy or monument in
the first instance. And while the endorsement test is not well suited for
determining the intent of the government actor, Marsh’s “impermissible
intent” test is. Thus, when speaking, the government violates the
Establishment Clause not simply by engaging in facially religious
speech but by engaging in such speech for the purpose of promoting or
advancing religion: “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over

195.
196.
2009).
197.
198.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599 (1989).
Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838–39 (1995).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983).
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another.” 199 Given the long-standing history of legislative invocations,
such facially religious speech violates the Establishment Clause only
when the government expressly exploits “the prayer opportunity to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.” 200
Of course, to survive Establishment Clause review, the government’s
proposed reason must “be sincere and not a sham.” 201 Thus, if a town
council, as in Wynne, uses legislative prayer “to advance its own
religious view in preference to all others” by excluding a member of the
community from the political process and soliciting support for its
specific sectarian practices from like-minded religious leaders, 202 the
town council cannot seek refuge in Marsh. But, as Marsh expressly
states, if the government does not use legislative prayer to promote or
disparage any particular faith, then the Establishment Clause is not
implicated, and absent a showing of impermissible intent, the courts will
not “parse the content of a particular prayer.” 203
Post-Summum, courts cannot simply rely on the facially religious
nature of the speech—i.e., what “the public ‘sees and hears’” 204 —when
resolving an Establishment Clause challenge because the government’s
reasons for engaging in speech (e.g., solemnizing legislative meetings in
Marsh or celebrating local history in Summum) may differ significantly
from the purpose that an observer ascribes to the government. But,
given that Marsh’s impermissible intent test focuses on whether the
government’s actual purpose is to proselytize or disparage a particular
religion, the Marsh test is also consistent with the distinguishing feature
of the government speech doctrine—the government’s right to determine
its own message within the two hundred year history of legislative
prayer.

199. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Under this view, the government must be
“non-preferential.” That is, although the government is allowed to favor religion over non-religion, it
cannot discriminate in favor of or against particular religions. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally . . . .”); Salazar v. Buono,
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818–19 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public
acknowledgment of religion’s role in society. . . . Rather, it leaves room to accommodate divergent
values within a constitutionally permissible framework.”). But see Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
200. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
201. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987).
202. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).
203. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
204. Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9,
2009) (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 282 (2005)).
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III. SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER UNDER MARSH AND SUMMUM
Although Marsh holds that the Founders did not “intend[] the
Establishment Clause of the [First] Amendment to forbid” legislative
prayers, 205 it does not expressly reference sectarian invocations. Thus,
even if Nebraska’s prayer policy is wholly consistent with “the
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat
to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to
that now challenged,” 206 a policy that allows sectarian references may
not be similarly consistent. But, given that Marsh does not permit
courts to focus initially on the content of the prayer, it might permit
some form of sectarian prayer. That is, under Marsh and Summum, the
sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the prayer is initially irrelevant to the
Establishment Clause analysis unless there is evidence that the
government had an impermissible motive: “[t]he content of the prayer is
not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication” that the
government intended to exploit the prayer opportunity. 207
Of course, if the same Presbyterian minister made sectarian references
to the same Presbyterian deity for sixteen years, the Supreme Court’s
analysis might have been different. Such continuing reliance on one
religious leader from one denomination to make sectarian references to
one deity might provide evidence that the Nebraska legislature was
discriminating in its selection procedure, proselytizing, or attempting to
advance that particular Christian sect. But the Marsh Court did not
preclude any and all sectarian references because to do so would have
been inconsistent with the long-standing history and tradition upon
which to Court relied. 208 As the Court stated in Van Orden v. Perry:

205. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
206. Id. at 791.
207. Id. at 794. Luther and Caddell rely on the same language from Marsh but do not believe this
language is compatible with the government speech doctrine. Luther & Caddell, supra note 5, at 596–
97 (“[T]his [government speech] doctrine must be reconsidered or else other manifestations of speech,
including but not limited to religious speech, are likely to become strangers to the public square.”).
There are at least two reasons that their argument is not persuasive. First, subsequent to their article, the
Court decided Summum, in which the Court provided its most detailed analysis of the government
speech doctrine and which alters the Establishment Clause analysis. Second, Luther and Caddell’s claim
that “the prayer itself . . . always should be viewed as private speech protected by the Free Exercise and
Free Speech Clauses” seems inconsistent with Marsh and Summum. Id. at 596. Given that the minister
in Marsh was employed and paid by the Nebraska, there is good reason to view his legislative prayers as
government speech, which the Court held to be constitutional. Moreover, other prayer practices might
be government speech even if Marsh is not and, provided they do not proselytize or disparage, could
survive Establishment Clause review.
208. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“As its history
abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly
neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

41

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
G-GAYLORD

1058

8/4/2011 2:15:21 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

“Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.” 209 Yet if Marsh and Summum allow for sectarian legislative
prayer in certain circumstances, it is important to consider when such
sectarian references are constitutional. The remainder of this Article
focuses on that consideration.
A. A Model Prayer Policy
As with most Establishment Clause claims, the constitutionality of a
particular sectarian invocation is fact dependent: “Establishment Clause
challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a case-by-case
basis with the result turning on the specific facts.” 210 Given the myriad
of ways that federal, state, and local governments might engage in
legislative prayer—from formal policies to spontaneous prayers at the
beginning of some meetings—there is no way to evaluate all possible
variations of sectarian invocations. Thus, to begin analyzing the
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayer under Marsh and
Summum, this subpart proposes a model policy, some form of which has
been used by legislatures and other deliberative bodies across the
country. 211 Drawing on Supreme Court precedent, the model policy
incorporates the general features of legislative prayer that courts have

pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.”); Snyder v. Murray City
Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he mere fact a prayer evokes a particular concept
of God is not enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Rather, what is prohibited by the clause
is a more aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization.”) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
209. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005); see also id. at 690 n.8 (2005) (Rehnquist,
C.J., plurality) (“In Marsh, the prayers were often explicitly Christian . . . .”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818
n.38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that several state legislatures engaged in overtly sectarian
legislative prayers); Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 285 n.23 (D.D.C. 2005) (recognizing that
“the legislative prayers at the U.S. Congress are overtly sectarian”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952) (“The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State. . . . Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. . . . Prayers in our legislative halls . . . and all other references
to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First
Amendment.”).
210. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984) (“[T]he inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.”).
211. The policy set forth is similar to the Forsyth County, North Carolina policy that currently is
pending before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, this Part considers the Establishment Clause
question in the context of an ongoing controversy. It also embodies some general features that the Court
and some commentators have taken to be important for sectarian legislative prayer under the
Establishment Clause—even though they might have applied the improper test. See, e.g., Delahunty,
supra note 5, at 565 (“The bedrock claim here is that by giving expression to the diversity of the state
population’s religious views by means of some such selection procedure, the legislature can insure that
no unconstitutional preference or endorsement arises.”).
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previously upheld to determine whether sectarian references under such
a policy would survive Establishment Clause review. Consider the
following model policy:
1. The purpose of this policy is to solemnize the proceedings of the
government entity by allowing an invocation or prayer to be
offered at the start of its meetings. 212
2. No person in attendance at any such meeting shall be required to
participate in any invocation or prayer that is offered. 213
3. The invocation or prayer shall be given by a volunteer who is a
religious leader or clergy member of a religious group with an
established presence in the local community. 214
a. The government entity shall compile a list of the religious
institutions with an established presence in the local community
from: (i) the annual Yellow Pages phone book entries for
“churches,” “congregations,” or “other religious assemblies;”
and (ii) requests from specific religious groups asking to be
included in the list. The government entity shall update the list
on or about November 1 of each calendar year. 215
b. On or about December 1 of each calendar year, the government
entity shall mail an invitation to the “religious leader” of each
congregation or religious group on the government entity’s list,
referenced in paragraph 3(a) above. 216
c. Individuals responding to the invitation shall be scheduled on a
first-come, first-serve basis to give an invocation or prayer at a
meeting during the next calendar year. 217
212. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Those government acknowledgments of
religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of
what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity,
those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs.”).
213. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (“Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult,
presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ . . . or peer pressure . . . .”).
214. Id. at 792 (“To invoke divine guidance on a public body . . . is not, in these circumstances,
and ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”). The “established presence” requirement
tracks the Court’s analysis in ballot access cases, where candidates must have a “significant modicum of
support.” See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S.
767, 782–83 (1974). Moreover, this requirement recognizes that there should be no Establishment
Clause problem if the government does not invite an individual who claims to represent a religion of one
because such an idiosyncratic religious belief would not be a part of “beliefs widely held among the
people of this country.” Id.
215. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2008).
216. There is nothing magical about the specific dates given in the model policy. The key is that
the government adheres to a set schedule to promote uniformity and to insure a consistent application of
the policy.
217. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Indeed,
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4. No person who gives an invocation or prayer shall be compensated
for his or her service. 218
5. The government entity shall take reasonable steps to ensure that a
variety of eligible invocational speakers are given the opportunity
to provide the invocation or prayer at the government entity’s
meetings, but no invocational speaker shall be scheduled to give
the prayer or invocation at consecutive meetings or at more than
two meetings during any calendar year. 219
6. The government entity shall not engage in any prior review of or
inquiry about the content of the prayer that any invocational
speaker might offer.
7. Prior to the start of the meeting, someone from the government
entity shall introduce the invocational speaker and invite those who
wish to do so to stand for the invocation or prayer. 220
8. By opening the prayer opportunity to all religious groups in the
community, the government entity intends to acknowledge and
express its respect for the diversity of religious denominations and
faiths represented and practiced among the members of the local
community. 221
Under this model policy, sectarian prayer is not only possible but also
probable. Because the government does not review the content of the
prayer before the meeting, invocational speakers may make specific
the selection aspect of the practice here is in many ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh
Court. . . . In contrast to Marsh’s single Presbyterian clergyman, the County welcomes rabbis, imams,
priests, pastors, and ministers. Chesterfield not only sought but achieved diversity. Its first-come, firstserve system led to prayers being given by a wide cross-section of the County’s religious leaders.”).
218. If there is no Establishment Clause violation when the government pays a chaplain, as in
Marsh, there should not be a violation when the religious leaders are not compensated for giving the
invocation. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 (“Nor is the compensation of the chaplain from public funds a
reason to invalidate the Nebraska Legislature’s chaplaincy; remuneration is grounded in historic
practice . . . .”); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 285 (“Indeed, the selection aspect of the practice here is in many
ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh Court. Ministers in Chesterfield, unlike in Marsh,
are not paid with public funds.”).
219. If the same chaplain could give the invocation for sixteen consecutive years, there should be
no Establishment Clause violation when the same clergy member gives an invocation twice during the
same year. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94 (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from
an impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the
Establishment Clause.”).
220. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“The influence and force of a formal exercise in
a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh. The Marsh majority
in fact gave specific recognition to this distinction and placed particular reliance on it in upholding the
prayers at issue there.”).
221. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 286 (“Chesterfield has likewise made plain that it was not affiliated
with any one specific faith by opening its doors to a very wide pool of clergy.”); Pelphrey v. Cobb
County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This diversity of speakers, in contrast with the chaplain
of one denomination allowed in Marsh, supports the finding that the County did not exploit the prayers
to advance any one religion.”).
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references to their specific deities, thereby giving rise to sectarian
legislative prayer. The model policy does not, by itself, determine the
difficult question of who is speaking—the government or the
invocational speaker: “[t]here may be situations in which it is difficult to
tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is
providing a forum for private speech.” 222 But, under Summum, this is a
threshold question given that the nature of the speaker dictates the
appropriate Establishment Clause test. Accordingly, the next subpart
attempts to do just this—consider who is speaking under the model
policy and decide whether sectarian invocations by each type of speaker
would survive Establishment Clause review.
B. Applying the Model Policy—Government Speech v. Private Speech
Because different Establishment Clause rules apply to different types
of speakers, courts must determine who is speaking before evaluating
the government’s prayer policy. If the government is speaking, then
Marsh’s intent test governs, but if the government has created a forum
for private invocations, then the endorsement test applies. But which is
it? Under the model policy, the government invites the leaders of all
religious organizations in the community but imposes no restrictions
(except perhaps precluding any proselytizing or disparaging references
to other religions) on the prayers that the speakers can give. Does this
constitute government speech? Is the government sending a message
through each prayer or through the policy as a whole? Has the
government simply adopted the speech of others to convey a message
about the diversity of religious traditions in the community while
solemnizing its meetings? Or has the government created a forum for
legislative prayer? If the latter, can the government exclude certain
speakers or certain types of prayers? If so, under what circumstances?
To begin answering these difficult Free Speech Clause and
Establishment Clause questions, it is useful to consider: (1) what
features of the model policy suggest government or private speech; and
(2) how the respective Establishment Clause tests apply to sectarian
prayers given by each type of speaker.
1. Sectarian Legislative Prayer as Government Speech
The government speech doctrine seems to create two immediate
Establishment Clause problems when applied to sectarian legislative

222. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
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prayers. First, if the government has effective control over speech that
contains sectarian references, then the government seems to be
endorsing one religion or sect over others in violation of the
Establishment Clause. By invoking the guidance or blessings of
“Jesus,” “Yahweh,” or “Allah” as part of its opening prayer, the
government suggests to others that it favors a specific religion. 223
Second, government sectarian prayer might contravene the
Establishment Clause principle set out in Lee: “[i]t is a cornerstone
principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ‘it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of
the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on
by government.’” 224 Thus, at first glance, it might appear that the
government speech doctrine makes the Establishment Clause problems
worse, not better.
But, as Marsh demonstrates, legislative prayers—whether sectarian or
nonsectarian—do not automatically violate the Establishment Clause.
Courts can determine the type of prayer only by looking at the language
used in a specific prayer. Yet, under Marsh, courts cannot inquire about
the content of the prayers unless the government has exploited the
prayer opportunity. Thus, the constitutionality of legislative prayer
cannot hinge on an a priori classification of the prayers as sectarian or
nonsectarian. That is, because Marsh prohibits courts from parsing the
language of invocations, the government as speaker can permit sectarian
invocations provided it does not have an impermissible motive. If, as
under the model policy, the government’s intent is to solemnize its
meetings and to acknowledge the diverse religious traditions in the
community, then there is no basis for the courts to look into or parse the
content of the prayers. Under these circumstances, the distinction
between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers falls away.
Furthermore, if the government is speaking, legislative prayer does
not implicate the threat the Court identifies in Lee because the
government is not composing an official prayer for others to recite.
Instead, the government is either giving the prayer itself or “enlist[ing]
private entities to convey its own message.” 225 If the former, then the
repeated use of the same sectarian references could, as in Wynne, give
rise to an Establishment Clause violation. Having government officials
give the same prayers from the same faith perspective could demonstrate
the government’s intent to proselytize or advance a particular faith. But
even this does not give rise to an automatic Establishment Clause
223. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005).
224. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
225. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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violation. After all, Nebraska retained the same Presbyterian minister,
who gave the same type of sectarian and Judeo–Christian prayers over a
sixteen year period, without violating the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, if the government adopts the speech of others as its own,
legislative prayers given by third parties still could be government
speech: “Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection
require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in
the communication.” 226 Under Summum and Hurley, the government
can assemble various religious leaders to convey its message through the
opening prayers: “But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter
of the speech.” 227 And this is true regardless of how third parties
interpret the prayer policy: “Indeed, this general rule[’s] . . . point is
simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those
choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even
hurtful.” 228 By adopting a formal prayer policy, the government entity
controls both the types of prayer permitted as well as the speakers who
are eligible to deliver them. By allowing established religious groups in
the area to offer prayers from their specific faith traditions, the
government controls the legislative prayers and combines the
“multifarious [religious] voices” to convey its desired message. 229
Furthermore, if the government is speaking, it presumably could
request or even require invocational speakers to avoid proselytizing or
disparaging other religions. Such a request would be consistent with the
government having control over the speech:
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the
parade from potential participants, and though the score may not produce

226. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570
(1995). In Hurley, the parade organizers did not create or dictate the specific content of each group
marching in the parade. Id. at 569. Yet the organizers did not lose the protection of the First
Amendment simply because they assembled various groups that, when combined, did not convey only
one specific message. Id. at 569–70. In fact, the First Amendment expressly protected their right to
determine which groups would be allowed to march in the parade. Id. at 574 (“Rather like a composer,
the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score
may not produce a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports
with what merits celebration on that day.”).
227. Id. at 569–70.
228. Id. at 573–74.
229. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The
context, and to a degree, the content of the invocation segment is governed by established guidelines by
which the Board may regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it ‘enlists private entities
to convey its own message.’” (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 292 F. Supp. 2d
805, 819 (E.D. Va. 2003))).
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a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s
eyes comports with what merits celebration . . . . [T]he Council clearly
decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication it
chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker
to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent
on another. 230

As a speaker, the government has the right to exclude messages it does
not like, such as “proselytization” or “disparagement,” especially when
Marsh expressly precludes the government from exploiting the prayer
opportunity for these purposes. In requesting that speakers avoid such
invocations, the government would be demonstrating that its intent
conforms to Establishment Clause requirements: “[t]he Marsh Court’s
focus was—as ours should be—not on the content of the prayer but on
the practices and motivations behind the prayer opportunity.” 231 As a
result, by requiring speakers to conform with Marsh, the government
would be conforming its message to the Establishment Clause, not
violating it.
In addition, the fact that the government might adopt the prayer policy
to convey a particular message while a particular invocational speaker
might give the prayer to promote her particular faith does not by itself
violate the Establishment Clause:
[A] painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned and
painted to express religious thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is
donated to the museum by a patron who shares those thoughts and
feelings, it does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting,
intends to convey or is perceived as conveying the same “message.” 232

Under Summum, the government can allow a religious leader to refer to
“Jesus,” “Yahweh,” “Allah,” or some other deity without intending to
adopt or promote that leader’s particular faith. Under Marsh, Summum,
and Salazar, the fact that the public “sees and hears” facially religious
speech 233 —be it legislative prayers, a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments, or a solitary Roman cross on Sunrise Rock—is not
230. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
231. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188, 212 (5th Cir. 2006) (Clement, J.,
dissenting). See also Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1416 n.9 (6th Cir. 1987) (Wellford,
J., dissenting) (“That these [congressional sectarian] invocations pass constitutional muster according to
Marsh indicates, it seems to me, a critical flaw in the majority’s analysis. The mention of the Deity,
even in the Christian context, in the invocation and benediction at issue, are not of critical import as
indicated in the constitutional practices of the Senate chaplain.”).
232. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 n.5 (2009).
233. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *8 (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 9, 2009) (“Critically, it is the prayers themselves that the public ‘sees and hears,’ not the selection
policy.”).
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dispositive. Instead of analyzing how third parties might interpret the
government’s message, courts must consider the government’s intent.
Thus, because the government’s intended message is controlling, 234 the
model policy can permit sectarian references by religious leaders of
different faiths without contravening Establishment Clause principles.
Under the government speech doctrine, then, the government can
claim the speech of third parties as its own, even if it sets only the
general parameters of the policy and not the specific content of the
prayers. For example, in Marsh, the Nebraska legislature did not control
the specific content of the minister’s prayers, which remained “Judeo–
Christian” even after the minister removed specific references to
“Christ.” 235 But the legislative prayers still were government speech
and still did not violate the Establishment Clause. Similarly, under
Marsh and Summum, government officials can allow religious leaders
from diverse faiths to make sectarian references in the invocation to
convey their desired message:
Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they
view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such
content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture. The
monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the
effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute
government speech. 236

There are two important corollaries to the government’s right to select
religious speakers. First, given the government’s control over its
message, it also must have the right to exclude other would-be speakers,
such as atheists and agnostics, without infringing the Establishment
Clause. That is, because Marsh permits the government to advance
religion over nonreligion by allowing prayer at the beginning of its
meetings, 237 the government must be able to exclude nonreligious or
anti-religious speakers under the model policy. 238 Otherwise, a third
party could demand the right to speak at the opening of a meeting,

234. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (“Contrary to respondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is not
possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and consequently, the
thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”).
235. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983).
236. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
237. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 673
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect individuals from
mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer cannot escape invalidation.”).
238. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘impermissible
motive’ standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to pray. The standard instead
prohibits purposeful discrimination.”).
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forcing the government as speaker to relinquish the protection afforded
by the First Amendment: “Under this approach any contingent of
protected individuals with a message would have the right to participate
in [the organizers’] speech [which would] violate[] the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” 239 Thus, Marsh
and Summum permit the government to limit the prayer policy to
religious groups with an established presence in the community.
Second, the model policy is not unconstitutional simply because
representatives from one faith repeatedly give the invocation. Under the
model policy, a particular leader from a specific congregation can give
an invocation at most twice during the year, but there is no limit on how
many times individuals who are Methodist, Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, or
some other faith can lead the prayers. The policy depends on volunteers
who sign-up on a first-come, first-serve basis. If one faith constitutes
the largest denomination in a community and many religious leaders of
that same denomination volunteer, it is unremarkable that the majority
of speakers would be from that one faith. But, as Zelman v. SimmonsHarris explains in the context of school vouchers, the religious make-up
of the community does not automatically violate Establishment Clause
principles:
It is true that 82% of Cleveland’s participating private schools are
religious schools, but it is also true that 81% of private schools in Ohio
are religious schools. To attribute constitutional significance to this
figure, moreover, would lead to the absurd result that . . . an identical
private choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as
Maine or Utah, where less than 45% of private schools are religious
schools, but not in other States, such as Nebraska or Kansas, where over
90% of private schools are religious schools. 240

Unlike the school choice program in Zelman, which was “entirely
neutral with respect to religion,” 241 a legislative prayer policy is not.
But Marsh established that the lack of “neutrality” between religion and
nonreligion with respect to legislative invocations is wholly consistent
with the Establishment Clause, i.e., that the Founders did not intend the
Establishment Clause to preclude legislative prayer. Hence, provided
that the selection process is neutral, any disparity in the percentages of
particular faiths that participate in the prayer policy violates the
Establishment Clause only if the “reappointment stemmed from an
239. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
240. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 657 (2002).
241. Id. at 662.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss3/3

50

Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
G-GAYLORD

2011]

8/4/2011 2:15:21 PM

SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER

1067

impermissible motive.” 242
Under the model prayer policy, however, there is no basis to ascribe
an impermissible intent to the government. The policy is designed to
show the government’s “commitment to participation by persons of all
faiths in public life.” 243 Even though the government’s speech might
contain sectarian references, the model policy is open to all faiths on
equal terms and, as a result, it is more inclusive than the policy upheld in
Marsh 244 and it avoids the problem of having the government analyze
the terms of each prayer to determine whether it is “too sectarian,” i.e., it
enables the government to stay out of the business of regulating and
approving the content of the legislative prayers. Accordingly, if the
legislative invocations are government speech, then, absent evidence of
the government’s exploiting the prayer opportunity to proselytize or
disparage, sectarian and nonsectarian prayers should pass Establishment
Clause review.
2. Sectarian Legislative Prayers as Private Speech
If the government is not speaking through the opening prayers, then
the invocation givers must be the speakers for First Amendment
purposes. That is, if the government lacks the requisite control over the
prayers, then it must have created a “prayer forum” at the start of its
meetings by opening the prayer opportunity to the leaders of the various
religions in the community. 245 As a result, given that legislative prayers
implicate both the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, the
government must satisfy both the forum rules imposed by the Free
242. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983). Just as the Cleveland officials did not
create the disparity in parochial and secular private schools in Zelman, government officials do not
control the religious demographics of the community. By opening the prayer opportunity to all faiths in
the community, the government shows respect for all religions and allows for “a wide cross-section of
the County’s religious leaders” to participate. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d
276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005). The fact that some religious groups may not want to participate or that some
denominations provide the prayer on more than one occasion does not change the analysis.
243. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283.
244. See, e.g., Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1274 (“The taxpayers would have us parse legislative prayers
for sectarian references even when the practice of legislative prayers has been far more inclusive than
the practice upheld in Marsh. We decline this role of ‘ecclesiastical arbiter,’ . . . for it ‘would achieve a
particularly perverse result . . . .’” (internal citations omitted)).
245. In Summum, the Court recognized that the same could happen in relation to permanent
monuments:
To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the forum doctrine might
properly be applied to a permanent monument—for example, if a town created a
monument on which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other criterion) could
place the name of a person to be honored or some other private message.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009).
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Speech Clause and the anti-establishment concerns protected by the
Establishment Clause. The government’s ability to preclude particular
speakers depends on the specific type of forum created—designated
open, designated limited, or nonpublic. 246 No longer having effective
control over the message to qualify for protection under the government
speech doctrine, the government loses its ability to make content-based
and viewpoint-based distinctions.
Instead, at a minimum, the
government restrictions on the forum must be reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. 247 Moreover, under the Establishment Clause, because the
government opened its meetings to third party speech, the government
must remain neutral between and among the speakers who use the
forum, which is a hallmark of the endorsement test. 248 That is, if the
government is not speaking, then the government cannot regulate in a
way that sends a message that a reasonable observer would interpret as
favoring one religious sect over another.
With respect to the free speech analysis, the government’s permitting
legislative invocations appears reasonable in light of Marsh’s approving
the two hundred year history of such prayers. Furthermore, legislative
prayers may, as Justice O’Connor acknowledged, serve the secular
purposes of “solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society.”249 Such purposes are served by prayers that the
government controls as well as by those that third parties offer in a
forum created by the government. Thus, given the long-standing history
and the secular justifications for such practices, it is reasonable for the
government to permit legislative prayer. But could the government limit
the speakers or the types of prayers in such a forum? If the government
opens up the forum at all, “must [it] relinquish its power to exclude

246. Legislative prayers at the start of government meetings are not a traditional open forum
because such meetings are not “streets and parks[,] which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
247. Id. at 46 (“Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication is governed by different standards. . . . In addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985) (stating that restrictions imposed on access to a nonpublic forum must be “reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and [be] viewpoint neutral”).
248. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (“A
central lesson of our decisions is that significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face
of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”).
249. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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those prayers that proselytize or disparage”? 250
In general, the government has greater authority to control who
speaks and on what topics when the speech occurs in a nonpublic forum.
Because the forum is not generally open to the public, the government
can preserve the forum for its intended purposes: “Implicit in the
concept of the nonpublic forum is the right [of the government] to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
identity.” 251 Similarly, if the government creates a designated limited
forum, it may restrict the forum “for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subject.” 252 Although
the government must remain viewpoint neutral under both types of
forum, the proposed model policy does not favor any religious
viewpoint over any other. By inviting all established religions to
participate, the government opens the prayer opportunity to all. This
may privilege religion over nonreligion because atheists and agnostics
are not invited, but Marsh, in allowing legislative prayer generally, held
that the Establishment Clause permits this type of “discrimination” in
favor of legislative prayers.
Thus, given the unique history of invocations under the First
Amendment, the government can create a legislative prayer forum with
the same Establishment Clause limitations that Marsh imposes on the
government when it is the speaker—no proselytizing or disparaging any
one religion. By allowing a variety of religious viewpoints and
prohibiting proselytizing and disparaging prayers, the government
insures neutrality between and among religions: “[T]he [Establishment
Clause’s] guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends
benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including
religious ones, are broad and diverse.” 253 And, as Marsh recognizes,
allowing legislative prayers is a “tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs
widely held among the people of the country” or the local
community. 254 Of course, the government cannot interject itself into the
forum in such a way that it favors particular religious speakers or
particular religious viewpoints, but the Establishment Clause does not
prevent the government from restricting the start of its meetings to the
intended purpose: “[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998) (Lucero, J., concurring).
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 46.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
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entrusted with making the laws.” 255
In a designated limited or nonpublic forum, then, the government can
preclude certain types of speakers or prayers, as in Turner and Snyder,
provided that the proffered prayer falls outside the viewpoint neutral
parameters that the government set in creating the forum. Prayers that
either disparage the religious beliefs of others or proselytize in relation
to a particular faith go beyond the historical context that supported
legislative prayer in the first instance. 256 As Marsh instructs, legislative
prayer by itself neither is “a proselytizing activity” nor does it
“symbolically plac[e] the government’s ‘official seal of approval on one
religious view.’” 257 Instead, “it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” 258
But even if legislative prayer does not encroach on free speech
principles, it still must pass Establishment Clause review. When the
government opens a forum and permits religious groups to use that
forum, 259 the Court has applied the endorsement test, and as evidenced
by Allegheny, is apt to do so with respect to legislative prayer. To
determine whether there is an unconstitutional endorsement, courts
evaluate the message the government conveys to a reasonable observer
who is aware of the history and context of the government activity. 260
But to understand the government’s message under the model policy,
one cannot consider a single prayer in isolation. While a Presbyterian
minister might give a prayer one week, an imam might provide the
invocation at the next meeting. Thus, a court must consider the entire
prayer policy, not just individual prayers in isolation:
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the crèche . . .
is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display—as a
typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a

255. Id.
256. There is a threat that, in determining whether a proposed prayer proselytized or disparaged,
the government would be reviewing the content of prayers and, therefore, would become “entangled”
with religion. But to the extent this is a problem, it is one that Marsh considered and resolved in favor
of legislative prayer. Recall that in rejecting the dissent’s argument, the Marsh majority noted that
“[t]he unbroken practice [of legislative prayer] for two centuries in the National Congress . . . gives
abundant assurance that there is no real threat ‘while this Court sits.’” Id. at 795 (quoting Panhandle Oil
Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
257. Id. at 792.
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838–40 (1995).
260. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010) (The endorsement “test requires the
hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the symbol and its placement.”).
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religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content. 261

As in the museum context, the reasonable observer must consider
individual prayers within the context of the model policy itself and the
long-standing tradition of legislative prayer. A reasonable observer who
is aware of the history and context of the model policy would know that:
(1) the government invites religious leaders from all religious groups
with an established presence in the community on a first-come, firstserve basis; (2) no religious leader is permitted to offer a prayer at
consecutive meetings or more than twice in a calendar year; (3) the
government neither reviews nor edits the prayers; and (4) the model
policy is intended to acknowledge and express the government’s respect
for the diversity of religious denominations and faiths represented and
practiced among its citizens.
Although the policy does not neutralize the religious import of a
particular sectarian invocation, the overall policy necessarily alters the
observer’s understanding of the purpose of the policy. Given the
diversity of the religions represented, the reasonable observer cannot
simply add up the various allegedly sectarian references and attribute
them to the government. Rather, the breadth of the model policy
demonstrates the government’s respect for all faiths and religions in the
community without making any person’s religious views relevant to that
person’s standing in the political community. 262 That is, because the
prayer opportunity is open to all established religions in the community,
the model policy does not “send[] a message to non-adherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.” 263
Instead of excluding or disparaging certain religions, the policy
“recognize[s] the rich religious heritage of our country in a fashion that
was designed to include members of the community, rather than to
proselytize.” 264 Consistent with Simpson, the model policy promotes the

261. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
262. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under the endorsement test, the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice
is relevant not because it creates an ‘artificial exception’ from that test. On the contrary, the ‘history and
ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.”).
263. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). See also
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The widely divergent viewpoints of these
many purveyors of opinion, all supported on an equal basis by the [government], significantly
diminishes the danger that the message of any one publication is perceived as endorsed by the
[government].”).
264. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008).
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“participation by persons of all faiths in public life.” 265 That the
opportunity is not open to the nonreligious does not contravene the
Establishment Clause because, as Marsh notes, “the delegates did not
consider opening prayers as a proselytizing activity of symbolically
placing the government’s ‘official seal of approval on one religious
view.’” 266 Thus, even though legislative prayer might allow for special
accommodation of religion, its “unique history” poses “no real threat to
the Establishment Clause.” 267
Of course, if the government creates a designated open forum in
which any member of the community (selected on a neutral basis, e.g.,
selected at random or on a first-come, first-serve basis) could speak at
the start of each meeting, 268 then the threat of an Establishment Clause
problem disappears. The government does not endorse religion over
non-religion or one sect over another by opening the forum to everyone.
In fact, if the forum is truly open to all speakers, the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government’s excluding religious speakers because
to do so would show hostility to religion: “[I]f a State refused to let
religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate
not neutrality but hostility toward religion.” 269 Put differently, by
creating a designated open forum, the government would relinquish its
ability to designate part of the meeting for legislative prayer. Marsh,
therefore, would have no application. Some speakers might give
sectarian invocations, others nonsectarian, and still others political or
non-religious statements—none of which would violate the
Establishment Clause because a reasonable observer who is aware of the
history and context would know that the government had opened the
forum to all speakers. Thus, absent some other constitutional problem
with the speech, such as obscenity or fighting words, the legislative
invocations would be beyond the control or censorship of the
government.

265. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005).
266. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 442 (1961)).
267. Id. at 791.
268. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (“The
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”).
269. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272–75 (1981) (noting that if a state-created forum is “generally” and “equally”
open to religious and non-religious groups, then permitting religious groups to have access to the forum
does not have a primary effect of advancing religion).
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CONCLUSION
The mention of legislative prayer, whether sectarian or nonsectarian,
tends to strike an emotional chord with people. Such public prayer, for
better or worse, takes that which is highly personal for some and
displays it in a public setting that is created and controlled by the
government. In addition to its emotional impact, legislative prayer
raises complex constitutional issues at the intersection of the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses. Although Marsh began exploring
this intersection, the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on the
endorsement test relegated Marsh to the status of an exception to the
Court’s traditional Establishment Clause rules. But Summum now
requires courts to reconsider this established interpretation of Marsh. In
light of the Court’s unanimous adoption of the government speech
doctrine, Marsh takes on new and broader significance as a majority of
the Court is poised to expand the government’s ability to accommodate
religion in the public sphere. In particular, the current “conservative”
majority of the Court appears ready to follow Justice Kennedy’s dissent
in Allegheny, recognizing that:
Marsh stands for the proposition, not that specific practices common in
1791 are an exception to the otherwise broad sweep of the Establishment
Clause, but rather that the meaning of the Clause is to be determined by
reference to historical practices and understandings. Whatever test we
choose to apply must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries
old but also any other practices with no greater potential for an
establishment of religion. 270

After Summum, the appropriate test for facially religious speech is
Marsh’s impermissible intent test, not the endorsement test. To
determine whether the government is speaking, courts must look at the
level of control that the government has over the speech. If the
government has “final approval authority” and exercises “effective[]
control,” then the message is the government’s. 271 That is, when
speaking, the government has the right to convey the message that it
“view[s] as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account
such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.” 272
And, under Marsh, this is also true for facially religious government
speech, such as legislative prayers. The “unique history” of legislative
invocations demonstrates that such prayers are consistent with the
270. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
271. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2010).
272. Id.
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Founders’ understanding of the Establishment Clause. 273 As a result,
courts are not to parse the content of the prayer—i.e., to look at the
specific sectarian or nonsectarian language used—absent evidence that
the government intended to exploit the prayer opportunity to proselytize
or promote one religion over another. 274 That is, if the government
simply intends to participate in the long-standing tradition of legislative
prayer, “it is not for [courts] to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.” 275
Moreover, if a Presbyterian minister’s delivering of Judeo–Christian
prayers is “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country,” 276 then so too are prayers—even
sectarian ones—given by diverse religious leaders from the community.
By allowing all religious leaders to pray consistently with their
respective faith traditions, the government celebrates all such faiths and
allows each to express its rich religious tradition through the opening
prayer. And the government’s desire to respect all the faiths in any
given community is consistent with the requirements of the
Establishment Clause as interpreted by Marsh, 277 Salazar,278
Pelphrey, 279 Turner, 280 and Simpson. 281
Thus, in light of Summum, Marsh is no longer an outlier but instead
stands as a cornerstone in the Court’s Establishment Clause
273. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S 783, 790 (1983).
274. In fact, if Marsh precluded any and all sectarian references, then many of the prayers that the
United States Senate chaplain gives would be unconstitutional under Allegheny and its progeny. The
Senate chaplain’s prayers have included such expressions as “We pray this in the name of our Lord and
Savior, Jesus Christ,” “in Jesus’ name,” and “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, god of our Lord Jesus
Christ.” See REVEREND RICHARD C. HALVERSON, PRAYERS OFFERED BY THE CHAPLAIN OF THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 98-43 (1984).
275. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. Justice Kennedy also expressed the same concern in his dissent in
Allegheny: “Obsessive, implacable resistance to all but the most carefully scripted and secularized forms
of accommodation requires this Court to act as censor, issuing national decrees as to what is orthodox
and what is not.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 677–78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
276. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
277. Id. at 786 (“From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the
practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious
freedom.”).
278. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige
government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”).
279. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘impermissible
motive’ standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to pray. The standard instead
prohibits purposeful discrimination.”).
280. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding
legislative prayers that “recognize[] the rich religious heritage of our country in a fashion that was
designed to include members of the community, rather than to proselytize”).
281. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging our nation’s “commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in public life”).
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jurisprudence. Federal, state, and local governmental entities may
participate in “the unambiguous and unbroken practice of . . . opening
legislative session with prayer” without violating the Establishment
Clause, even if such prayers contain sectarian references. 282 That a
reasonable observer may feel disaffected by a prayer policy does not
show that the government’s intended message violates the Establishment
Clause; it shows only that the message has a certain effect on that
observer. But this reaction by some observers simply is not sufficient to
create an Establishment Clause violation: “We do not doubt the sincerity
of those, who like respondent, believe that to have prayer in this context
risks the beginning of the establishment the Founding Fathers feared.
But this concern is not well founded.” 283 If a reasonable observer
dislikes the practice, the observer can exercise, what Summum takes to
be, a primary check on government speech—the right to vote for new
officials who will change or discontinue the prayer policy. 284 Subject to
this electoral check, though, Marsh leaves the decision whether to have
legislative prayer—be it sectarian or nonsectarian—to the government
speaker. And because Marsh is no longer an exception, the government
is also free to adopt other “policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion” 285 that are “deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country” 286 without
violating the Establishment Clause.

282. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
283. Id. at 795.
284. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“And of course, a
government entity is ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.’
‘If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.’”
(quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))).
285. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
286. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
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